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MANAGING DIGITAL DISCOVERY IN
CRIMINAL CASES
JENIA I. TURNER*
The burdens and challenges of discovery—especially electronic
discovery—are usually associated with civil, not criminal cases. This is
beginning to change. Already common in white-collar crime cases,
voluminous digital discovery is increasingly a feature of ordinary criminal
prosecutions.
This Article examines the explosive growth of digital evidence in
criminal cases and the efforts to manage its challenges. It then advances
three claims about criminal case discovery in the digital age. First, the
volume, complexity, and cost of digital discovery will incentivize the
prosecution and the defense to cooperate more closely in cases with
significant amounts of electronically stored information (ESI). Second,
cooperation between the parties will not be sufficient to address the serious
challenges that digital discovery presents to the fair and accurate
resolution of criminal cases. And third, for that reason, digital discovery in
criminal cases needs to be regulated more closely.
In crafting such regulation, courts and legislators can build on the
civil procedure model, which has grappled with the challenges of electronic
discovery for over two decades. The civil procedure experience suggests
that cooperation between the parties, active judicial involvement, and more
detailed rules are essential to the effective management of digital discovery.
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The civil litigation model has its limitations, however, and
policymakers must chart new ground to address some of the unique
demands of criminal cases. Recognizing the significant resource and
bargaining disparities in criminal cases, judges need to limit certain
negotiated waivers of discovery so as to prevent abuse. Where the interests
of justice demand it, courts may also need to help defendants obtain access
to digital discovery in detention or gather digital evidence from third
parties. These and other measures can help ensure that the cost and
complexity of digital discovery do not undermine the fairness and accuracy
of criminal proceedings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The burdens and challenges of discovery—especially electronic
discovery—are usually associated with civil cases. Yet this is beginning to
change: Already common in white-collar crime cases, voluminous digital
discovery is increasingly a feature of ordinary criminal prosecutions.1
Digital evidence in criminal cases is exploding. More and more
crimes, from theft to drug trafficking to child pornography, are committed
in cyberspace.2 Smartphones, digital devices, and programmable home
appliances have become central to our daily lives, and the evidence they
generate is increasingly used in the prosecution and defense of criminal
cases.3 Law enforcement is also proactively using advanced technology to
prevent and investigate crime, and these efforts result in digital evidence.4
As electronically stored information (ESI) in criminal cases expands,
its processing, disclosure, and review present novel problems for the
prosecution and the defense. How will the terabytes of evidence be
stored?5 Who should bear the cost of formatting digital evidence to make it
searchable?6
When digital files of wiretap recordings and video
surveillance are not searchable, should the prosecution be required to
categorize or index them?7 Should the prosecution be required to identify

1
Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, April 28, 2017, at 22, in Advisory Committee
on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., October 24, 2017, at 40; Memorandum from
Professors Sara Sun Beale and Nancy King, Reporters, to Criminal Rules Committee, April
12, 2017, in Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28,
2017, at 167 (“All attendees [of mini conference hosted by the Rules Committee] agreed that
ESI discovery problems can arise in both small and large cases, that these issues are handled
very differently between districts, and that most criminal cases now include ESI.”)
[hereinafter Beale and King Memorandum].
2
See infra Part II.
3
See id.
4
Michael R. Doucette, Virginia Prosecutors’ Response to Two Models of Pre-Plea
Discovery in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE
415, 430 (“With modern technology, law enforcement generates far greater discoverable
information. Dash-mounted camera video, body worn camera video, and jailhouse telephone
audio are just a few examples of this new technology. One individual traffic stop could
generate several hours of video and audio evidence.”); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 354–75 (2015).
5
See infra Part IV.A.
6
See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 296 (6th Cir. 2010).
7
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, No. 3:13-CR-161, 2014 WL 2574765, at *1–3
(E.D. Tenn. June 6, 2014).
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exculpatory evidence within a gargantuan ESI production?8 How will
metadata and sensitive information be handled?9 How should access to
digital discovery be provided to defendants who are detained before trial?10
A growing number of criminal cases present these questions and more.
The lack of time, resources, and expertise to process and review
voluminous digital evidence (especially on the defense side) is leading to
disputes about which party bears the burden of searching for relevant and
potentially exculpatory documents.11 With respect to sensitive documents
(which might contain items such as child pornography, information that
may endanger witnesses, and confidential documents), the parties must
determine what type of access complies with the discovery rules while
safeguarding important public interests.12 Third-party possession of
relevant evidence may also complicate discovery, particularly for
defendants, because they have limited means of obtaining digital evidence
from non-parties.13 Finally, cases where defendants are detained raise
special problems because inmates have limited or no access to electronic
evidence in jail and thus have difficulty assisting their attorneys in
preparing an effective defense.14
The lack of clear legal rules adds to the difficulty. Rules of criminal
procedure are typically silent on digital discovery, and case law is scant and
varies greatly from one court to the next.15 Practitioners are therefore left to
8

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Parts IV.A and IV.C.
10
See infra Part IV.E.
11
See, e.g., State v. Dingman, 202 P.3d 388, 395–96 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (involving
dispute about the format in which evidence must be produced); United States v.
Rubin/Chambers, 825 F. Supp. 2d 451, 453–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (involving dispute about the
format of production and the burden of identifying exculpatory documents).
12
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 191 F. Supp. 3d 363, 366–69 (M.D. Pa. 2016)
(dispute about scope of discovery in light of protective order); Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d
487, 503 (Tex. App. 2002) (dispute about the location where evidence of child pornography
crime may be reviewed by defense counsel).
13
See Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Criminal Discovery of Internet
Communications Under the Stored Communications Act: It’s Not A Level Playing Field, 97
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 569, 590–97 (2007).
14
See, e.g., Sean Broderick & Russell M. Aoki, Federal Indigent Defense: How to Stop
Worrying and Love the Digital Age, 30 CRIM. JUST., Winter 2016, at 4, 9.
15
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; United States v. Meredith, No. 3:12-CR-00143-CRS,
2015 WL 5570033, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2015). But see N.J. CT. R. 3:13; cf. M.R.U.
CRIM. P. 16 (noting that where practicable, the prosecutor must provide the defendant “an
opportunity to obtain an electronic copy, at any reasonable time and in any reasonable
manner,” and where the prosecutor is unable to do so, “because the technology makes such
provision impracticable,” or when copying is not legally permitted, the prosecutor must
provide the defendant “a reasonable opportunity” to review such evidence).
9
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devise solutions on an ad hoc basis, through informal discussions and
negotiations.16
After analyzing these problems, the Article advances three claims
about the future of criminal case discovery in the digital age. First, the
volume, complexity, and cost of digital discovery will incentivize the
prosecution and the defense to cooperate more closely in cases with
significant amounts of ESI. Second, cooperation between the parties will
not be sufficient to address the serious challenges that digital discovery
presents to the fair and accurate resolution of criminal cases. And third, for
that reason, digital discovery in criminal cases needs to be regulated more
closely. In crafting regulation, courts and legislators can build on the civil
procedure model of electronic discovery, while recognizing the differences
between civil and criminal cases and tailoring new rules accordingly.
As the volume of ESI in criminal cases expands, defense attorneys and
prosecutors will feel greater pressure to cooperate and negotiate about
discovery. Decisions in cases with massive digital evidence already
reference informal agreements between the parties to tailor the scope of
discovery and to assist the defense with ESI processing.17 The presence of
ESI is changing the parties’ incentives and leading them to shift from a
largely adversarial to a more collaborative approach to discovery.18
Collaboration in electronic discovery (e-discovery) is already heavily
encouraged in complex civil cases. As ESI has proliferated over the last
two decades, both the rules of civil procedure and judicial decisions have
promoted consultation and negotiation between parties about e-discovery.19
Initial evidence suggests that, when cooperation occurs, it reduces the costs
of e-discovery and is well-received by the litigants.20 Accordingly, the civil
procedure model can offer useful guidance for reforming digital discovery
in criminal cases.21
16

See infra Part V.A.
See id.
18
See infra Part V.B.
19
FED. R. CIV. P. 26; see also Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C
5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (“Since its publication in 2009,
more than 100 federal judges have endorsed the Cooperation Proclamation [which urges
parties to adopt a collaborative approach to discovery].”); Sedona Conference, Commentary
on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 289 (2010); SHIRA A.
SCHEINDLIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN A
NUTSHELL 106 (2009) (noting judicial endorsement of collaborative approach to ediscovery).
20
See infra note 330and accompanying text.
21
Cf. Russell M. Gold et al., Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607
(2017) (arguing in favor of adopting civil-like settlement procedures in the criminal system);
17
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In fact, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, which recently
considered the challenges of digital evidence in criminal cases, took note of
the civil procedure experience and opted to encourage greater cooperation
between the parties. The Committee approved a new draft rule of criminal
procedure, Rule 16.1, which expressly requires the prosecution and the
defense to meet and confer about pretrial disclosure shortly after
arraignment.22 Should negotiation between the parties fail, the parties “may
ask the court to determine or modify the timing, manner, or other aspects of
disclosure to facilitate preparation for trial.”23
Such efforts to promote cooperation are an important first step, but are
not sufficient to address the serious challenges of digital discovery in
criminal cases.24 Cooperation will fail to yield results where the volume of
evidence overwhelms one or both of the parties.25 Negotiations between
the parties can also lead to unfair results, especially because the standard
criminal case features disparities between the defense and prosecution in
terms of resources, investigative powers, and bargaining leverage.26
Furthermore, because prosecutors and defense attorneys are likely to differ
in their willingness to bargain, negotiations are also likely to lead to
disparate results in similarly situated cases. To avoid these negative

Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1091 (2014) (arguing for comparative analysis of civil and criminal
discovery regimes); David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without
Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94
GEO. L.J. 683 (2006) (arguing in favor of comparative analysis of the civil and criminal
procedure models).
22
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate,
Bankruptcy, and Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, and the Rules Governing Section
2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts (Aug. 2017), at
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/preliminary_draft_08_2017_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/46NM-M8YF] [hereinafter Draft Rule 16.1].
23
Id.
24
See infra Parts VC & VI.B.
25
See United States v. Budovsky, No. 13 CR 00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016) (“Given the fact that the discovery contains so many pages and
lines of data, no attorney or team of attorneys could meaningfully review all of it even with
years to prepare for trial. The parties agree that choices have to be made; the Government
freely admits that it has not reviewed all of the material in this case.”).
26
See generally Human Rights Watch, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How U.S. Federal
Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty (2013); Albert W. Alschuler, The
Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 66, 85–105 (1968); Rachel E.
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative
Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 874–84 (2009); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and
Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004).
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consequences of negotiated digital discovery, stricter regulation of the
process is needed.
As courts and legislators consider suitable regulation for e-discovery
in criminal cases, they can look to the civil experience for helpful insights
on managing the challenges of digital evidence. While promoting
cooperation, legislators should also draft more detailed rules to guide ediscovery where cooperation fails.27 Judges should become more active in
managing the discovery process and should involve magistrates in the
effort.28
At the same time, policymakers must adjust the civil model to meet the
unique practical demands and legal environment of criminal cases.29 The
lack of resources in criminal cases—especially on the defense side—will
demand the reallocation of criminal justice budgets and the creation of
specialized infrastructure to ensure that digital discovery does not produce
unfair and unjust outcomes.30 The more robust constitutional protections in
criminal cases—including the rights to due process, speedy trial, and
effective counsel—may require greater judicial involvement in ensuring
that digital discovery proceeds fairly. To ensure such fairness, judges need
to take into account the special difficulties detained defendants face in
accessing computers31 and the hurdles that criminal defense attorneys
experience in gathering digital evidence from third parties.32 Courts must
also recognize the vastly unequal bargaining powers of the prosecution and
defense and limit negotiated waivers of critical discovery rights to prevent
abuse.33 Finally, courts and legislators need to draft clearer background
rules about digital discovery to enhance predictability, promote consistent
treatment across cases, and reduce disputes about digital discovery.
In the more distant future, technological innovation may help the
criminal justice system solve many of the problems that plague discovery of
voluminous digital evidence today. Until then, the parties can ease some of
the difficulties of digital discovery by cooperating with each other. But
where cooperation fails or reflects vastly unequal bargaining powers, rules
and judicial decisions must provide a backstop. Tailored regulation of ediscovery in criminal cases is needed to ensure that the novel problems
27

See infra Part VI.C.
Id.
29
See infra Part VI.B & VI.C.
30
See infra Part VI.C.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. For a general discussion of the ethical and legal concerns with discovery waivers,
see Ellen S. Podgor, Pleading Blindly, 80 MISS. L.J. 1633, 1641 (2011).
28
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posed by digital evidence do not undermine the fairness, accuracy, and
transparency that discovery rules were designed to ensure.
II. EXPANDING DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
Information technology has become ubiquitous. As it permeates our
daily lives, it also leaves digital footprints that can be useful sources of
evidence in criminal cases. This occurs in three principal ways.
First, the daily activities of individuals and businesses are increasingly
facilitated—and thus recorded—by digital devices. Businesses document
“virtually all” of their operations in electronic form.34 With more than 92%
of U.S. adults owning cell phones and roughly three-fourths owning a
computer, individuals also record most of their own movements,
communications, and images in a digital format.35 Our cars, houses, and
workplaces are increasingly connected to the Internet, creating massive
databases of our daily activities.36 When a crime is committed, the digital
trace left by our pervasive use of technology provides an invaluable
investigative resource.37 It also creates a mass of discoverable evidence for
prosecutors and defense attorneys to sift through.
Second, just as ordinary individuals use computers and the Internet on
a regular basis, criminals increasingly rely on digital technology to ply their
trade. A recent report on gang activity found that “there’s nearly always a
link between an outbreak of gang violence and something online.”38
Crimes as varied as theft, fraud, hacking, child pornography, drug
trafficking, and the sale of stolen identities and ransomware today occur, at
least in part, on the Internet. As FBI Director Wray remarked earlier this
year:
[T]here’s a technology and digital component to almost every case we have now.

34

James N. Dertouzos et al., RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., The Legal and Economic
Implications of Electronic Discovery: Options for Future Research 1 (2008).
35
Monica Anderson, The Demographics of Device Ownership, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 29,
2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/the-demographics-of-device-ownership
[https://perma.cc/E5YR-ESHH].
36
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of
Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 819–20 (2016).
37
See, e.g., Marlo Pfister Cadeddu & Eric J.R. Nichols, State Criminal Discovery Rules
and ESI, TXBB-E-DISCOVERY § 23.5 (2014) (“Requests for electronic storage media devices
and data have now become commonplace components of search warrants . . . .”).
38
Michael Tarm, Social Media Altering Street-Gang Culture, Fueling Violence, CHI.
SUN TIMES (June 11, 2018, 12:34 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/social-mediastreet-chicago-gang-culture-fueling-violence/ [https://perma.cc/U7N2-BWH6].
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Transnational crime groups, sexual predators, fraudsters, and terrorists are
transforming the way they do business as technology evolves. Significant pieces of
these crimes—and our investigations of them—have a digital component or occur
almost entirely online . . . .
And the avalanche of data created by our use of technology presents a huge
challenge for every organization.39

Private companies that have analyzed the incidence of cybercrime in
the United States report a dramatic increase.40 One analysis found that from
2013 to 2015, costs of cybercrime quadrupled, and it further predicted that
they will quadruple again from 2015 to 2019.41 The rise of cybercrime is a
global phenomenon. In 2016, Europol reported that “the additional increase
in volume, scope and financial damage combined with the asymmetric risk
that characterizes cybercrime has reached such a level that in some EU
countries cybercrime may have surpassed traditional crime in terms of
reporting.”42 As cybercrime grows, it also creates vast amounts of
electronic evidence that needs to be reviewed and disclosed in a criminal
prosecution.
The surveillance activities of law enforcement provide the third
principal source of digital evidence. Police are proactively using a wide
array of digital technology to prevent and investigate crime. Automatic
license plate readers, body cameras, facial recognition technology,
surveillance cameras, GPS tracking, and cell site location data, to name just

39
Remarks by Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Fordham
University, Jan. 9, 2018.
40
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER, 2016
ANNUAL REPORT, available at https://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreports.aspx (source on file
with author) (reporting an increase in financial losses due to Internet-facilitated crime since
2012); Danielle Wiener-Bronner, Report Shows Cyber Crime is on the Rise, ATLANTIC (Apr.
22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/04/report-shows-cyberespionage-is-on-the-rise/361024/ (reporting an overall increase in the threat of cybercrime in
the United States in 2014).
41
Steve Morgan, Cyber Crime Costs Projected To Reach $2 Trillion by 2019, FORBES
(Jan. 17, 2016, 11:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/01/17/cybercrime-costs-projected-to-reach-2-trillion-by-2019/#4153107d3a91 [https://perma.cc/5LQM9R24].
42
EUROPOL, IOCTA 2016: INTERNET ORGANISED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 7,
available
at
https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/internetorganised-crime-threat-assessment-iocta-2016 [https://perma.cc/RJ6K-AZNY]. In the United
Kingdom, online fraud has become the most common crime. Martin Evans & Patrick Scott,
Fraud and Cyber Crime Are Now the Country’s Most Common Offences, TELEGRAPH (Jan.
19, 2017, 6:05 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/19/fraud-cyber-crime-nowcountrys-common-offences/https:// [perma.cc/HWS3-8G8C].
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a few, have become critical tools of the modern police.43 As the Supreme
Court remarked in Carpenter v. United States last term, “seismic shifts in
digital technology” have allowed for near-constant surveillance by law
enforcement.44 This new type of policing produces massive amounts of
digital data, even for ordinary crimes.45 The result is that, “[f]rom Fitbits to
PlayStations, the justice system is drowning in digital evidence.”46
III. BACKGROUND DISCOVERY REQUIREMENTS
To appreciate why voluminous ESI presents challenges for the parties
in criminal cases, it is important to understand the basic discovery
responsibilities of prosecutors and defense attorneys. Constitutional
doctrine, statutory law, and rules of criminal procedure regulate when,
what, and how the parties need to disclose to each other. This Part provides
a brief overview of these laws and highlights a few aspects of discovery
rules that make digital discovery particularly challenging.
The Supreme Court has set a constitutional baseline for prosecutors’
obligations, requiring that prosecutors disclose exculpatory and
impeachment evidence before trial.47 State and federal rules additionally
require the prosecution to produce statements by the defendant, as well as
certain documents and expert reports that are relevant to the case—whether
in digital or paper form.48
Beyond that shared baseline, discovery rules vary significantly from
state to state—both as to the type of evidence that must be disclosed and as
to the timing of the discovery. As a result of recent discovery reforms, a
43

See generally ANDREW G. FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING:
SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017) (discussing the
increasing use of a range of new surveillance technologies by law enforcement).
44
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
45
See Sean Broderick et al., Criminal E-Discovery: A Pocket Guide for Judges, FJCMISC-2015-5 (2015) (noting that even routine prosecutions of drug cases and robberies
regularly rely on cell phone data or video surveillance).
46
Matt Burgess, From Fitbits to PlayStations, the Justice System Is Drowning in Digital
Evidence, WIRED U.K. (Apr. 20, 2018), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-police-courtsdata-justice-trials-digital-evidence-rape-cases-cps [https://perma.cc/JJ9W-CRDP].
47
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (holding that due process was
violated and a new trial warranted when the prosecution failed to disclose information
regarding the credibility of its witness and the witness’s credibility was material to guilt or
innocence); See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
48
See, e.g., FED R. CRIM. P. 16; ALA. R. CRIM. P. 16; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1054; N.Y. CRIM.
P. L. § 240; TEX. CODE CRIM. P. § 39.14.
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slight majority of states now require the prosecution to disclose witness
names, witness statements, and police reports before trial.49 A few states
have gone further and adopted entirely “open-file” discovery, requiring
prosecutors to disclose to the defense well before trial virtually all evidence
relevant to the case.50 Even in jurisdictions where discovery rules are not as
demanding, local rules, standing court orders, or internal prosecutorial
policies frequently mandate that prosecutors produce broader categories of
evidence early in the process.51
As prosecutorial duties to disclose evidence have expanded, so have
reciprocal duties for the defense.52 Today, “[n]early all states . . . require
defendants to give advance notice of any expert evidence and of witnesses
they will use for certain defenses (such as alibi, self-defense, and insanity)
and also to cooperate in ‘giving evidence’ through means such as blood
tests or participation in identification line-ups.”53 Further, discovery rules
ordinarily require a defendant who has availed himself of prosecutorial
disclosures to disclose a range of items (such as documents and tangible
objects, results or reports of physical or mental examinations or scientific
tests, and summaries of expert testimony) that are in his custody or control
and that the defense intends to use at trial.54 A few states have even
expanded defense disclosure duties to include witness names and
statements.55
When either party discloses evidence, it also typically has a duty to
ensure that disclosure would not harm the privacy or safety of affected
individuals. Accordingly, when the prosecution is required to produce
49
See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (2015); Darryl K.
Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication,
93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1622–23 (2005). Seventeen states currently require some version of
open-file discovery. Jenia I. Turner & Allison Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in
Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH & LEE L. REV. 285, 399, at App’x 2
(2016).
50
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. § 39.14.
51
Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules Revolution in Criminal Discovery, 39 CARDOZO
L. REV. 59, 61 (2017).
52
See Wayne R. LaFave et al., The “Two-Way Street” Movement in Discovery, 5 CRIM.
PROC. § 20.1(d) (4th ed. 2017).
53
Darryl K. Brown, Discovery, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
PROCESSES 147, 167 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), http://academyforjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/7_Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_3_Discovery.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7UA7-6AQY].
54
See, e.g., FED R. CRIM. P. 16(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(d).
55
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(d); N.J. Ct. R. 3:13; see also TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE &
TEXAS APPLESEED, IMPROVING DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES IN TEXAS: HOW BEST
PRACTICES CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER JUSTICE 15, 38 (2013); Brown, supra note 53, at 155.
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police reports or witness statements to the defense, but it has concerns
about the safety or privacy of its witnesses, it can request that the court
issue protective orders,56 or it may be able to redact portions of the
disclosed documents.57 Some states, like Texas, place on defense counsel
the burden of locating sensitive information and redacting it or withholding
it from the client and third parties.58
The trend toward broader discovery from the prosecution has been
motivated by concerns that restrictive discovery can result in wrongful
convictions, unjust sentences, and unnecessary litigation.59 The move
toward broader discovery from the defense has been spurred by a desire to
ensure more truthful outcomes.60 It has also been justified on grounds of
reciprocity—as defendants receive from the prosecution more than the
Constitution requires,61 they are also expected to provide reciprocal
disclosures.62
In complex cases with a large digital footprint, broad discovery means
that both the prosecution and the defense have to deal with voluminous
productions. The broadest discovery, so called “open-file” discovery, often
relieves prosecutors from the task of reviewing each individual file before
producing it. But the burden of review is then shifted onto the defense,
which has limited time and resources to sift through gigabytes of data.63
Moreover, even in open-file discovery regimes, the prosecution may still
have to review individual files carefully to ensure that it does not produce
evidence that is legally protected or may jeopardize the safety of witnesses.
Rules of criminal procedure have not kept pace with the growth of ESI
and the special demands it places on prosecutors and defense attorneys.
Federal and state rules remain silent on the problems related to the volume

56
E.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(l); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A–908; TEX. CODE CRIM.
P. art. 39.14(e)(1); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 16(f).
57
E.g., IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(9)(B); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 39.14(c).
58
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.2; IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(9)(A), 16(d)(1)(C);
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 39.14(f).
59
Turner & Redlich, supra note 49, at 290–91.
60
See, e.g., Jones v. Super. Ct. of Nevada Cty., 372 P.2d 919, 920 (Cal. 1962).
61
See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972); see also Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
62
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1975 enactment; see also LaFave,
supra note 52, at § 20.1(d) (noting that one motivation for the adoption of “reciprocal
discovery” from the defense has been to “even the playing field” between prosecutors and
defense attorneys in being able to prevent trial by ambush).
63
See infra notes 107, 113, 319–321 and accompanying text.
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and complexity of digital discovery.64 A few federal courts have issued
local rules or standing orders to address ESI;65 others have looked to the
rules of civil procedure as a model to resolve disputes; 66 and yet others
have experimented with case-by-case solutions.67 Digital discovery is
therefore handled differently from state to state, from court to court, and
from judge to judge.68 And as Part V discusses, in many cases, the parties
have been left to negotiate solutions on their own.
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF DIGITAL DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. STORAGE AND PROCESSING COSTS

The first challenge of cases involving ESI is the sheer volume of
information produced. As the use of digital technology has become
commonplace for individuals and businesses, cases involving gigabytes69—
and even terabytes70—of data are no longer unusual.71 Technology experts
64

See, e.g., United States v. Meredith, 2015 WL 5570033, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22,
2015) (noting a “dearth of precedent” on “what constitutes sufficiently usable discovery” in
the ESI context). The exception is New Jersey, which has specifically addressed the
challenges of e-discovery in criminal cases. See N.J. CT. R. 3:13–3.
65
McConkie, supra note 51; see also General Order Regarding Best Practices for
Electronic Discovery of Documentary Materials in Criminal Cases, G.O. 09-05 (W.D. Okla.
2009); Best Practices for Electronic Discovery in Criminal Cases (W.D. Wash. 2013).
66
United States v. Briggs, 831 F. Supp. 2d 623, 628 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); United States v.
O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18-24 (D.D.C. 2008); see also United States v. Warshak, 631
F.3d 266, 296 (6th Cir. 2010).
67
See infra Parts IV.A & IV.B.
68
Beale and King Memorandum, supra note 1, at 167.
69
Experts estimate that 1 GB contains between 50,000 to 75,000 pages of Word
documents. Doug Austin, eDiscovery Best Practices: Perspective on the Amount of Data
Contained in 1 Gigabyte, CLOUDNINE (Mar. 5, 2012), https://ediscovery.co/
ediscoverydaily/electronic-discovery/ediscovery-best-practices-perspective-on-the-amountof-data-contained-in-1-gigabyte/ [https://perma.cc/WJ5Q-CLD9]. Images require more
storage space, so 1 GB is estimated to hold just over 15,000 pages of images. LexisNexis
Discovery Services, Pages in a Gigabyte, LEXISNEXIS (2007), https://www.lexisnexis.com/
applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADI_FS_PagesInAGigabyte.pdf (source on file
with author). When it comes to videos, 1 GB can mean just about one hour of video. Melvin
Foo, How Much Can a 1TB Hard Drive Hold?,
PC NINJA (FEB. 8, 2012),
http://www.pcninja.us/how-much-can-a-1-tb-hard-drive-hold/
[https://perma.cc/LG5ZLLN8].
70
According to one estimate:
[C]onsidering that one terabyte is generally estimated to contain 75 million pages,
a one-terabyte case could amount to 18,750,000 documents, assuming an average
of four pages per document. Further assuming that a lawyer or paralegal can
review 50 documents per hour (a very fast review rate), it would take 375,000
hours to complete the review. In other words, it would take more than 185
reviewers working 2,000 hours each per year to complete the review within a year.
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estimate that “the global volume of electronically stored data is doubling
every two years,” meaning that the problem is increasing exponentially.72
The expanding volume of digital evidence makes it difficult for
attorneys in criminal cases to store the information in a way that can be
easily retrieved, reviewed, and used at trial as needed. For federal
prosecutors, storage and management of e-discovery is usually not a
problem because the Department of Justice has a centralized e-discovery
support framework for U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country.73
Funded by a six-year, $1.1 billion contract, the Litigation Technology
Service Center (“LTSC”) helps prosecutors “digitize[e] paper
documents . . . [and] cod[e] and load[] electronic documents into
databases.” 74 The services also include “Bates labeling, deduplication, and
email threading.”75 Importantly, digital files “are provided in a variety of

Assuming each reviewer is paid $50 per hour (a bargain), the cost could be more
than $18,750,000.
Austin, supra note 69. On the other hand, since videos take up much more space, 1 TB is
estimated to hold around 1,000 hours or about 40 days of video files. Foo, supra note 69.
71
See, e.g., United States v. Hofstetter, 2018 WL 813254, at *14 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 9,
2018) (noting discovery “consisting of well over a terabyte of data, approximately fifty
compact discs containing audio and video recordings, and numerous imaged computer hard
drives”); United States v. Budovsky, No. 13 CR 00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016) (involving terabytes of discoverable data); United States v. Salyer,
2011 WL 1466887, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Apr. 18, 2011) (“It is probably no exaggeration to state
that 1-2 terabytes of information are involved.”); United States v. Shafer, 2011 WL 977891,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2011) (involving 200 terabytes of ESI); see also 2017 REPORT OF
THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 227
(2018),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files
/
2017_report_of_the_ad_hoc_ committee_to_review_ the_criminal_justice_act -revised_ 2
811.9.17 .29_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM2Z-8GW3] [hereinafter CARDONE REPORT] (citing
witness from M.D.N.C. who testified that “it is not uncommon in this district to have fraud
cases where three [terabytes] of information have been provided to counsel”).
72
Cindy LaChapelle, The Cost of Data Storage and Management: Where Is It Headed in
2016?, DATA CENTER J., (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.datacenterjournal.com/cost-datastorage-management-headed-2016/ (source on file with author).
73
Sean Broderick, Written Testimony to Criminal Justice Act Committee, Feb. 19, 2016,
https://cjastudy.fd.org/sites/default/files/hearing-archives/san-franciscocalifornia/pdf/seanbrodericksan-franwrittentestimony-done.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7TRX62ED] (noting that in 2013, the DOJ awarded $1.1 billion for contractors to provide the
Criminal Division and six other units with electronic discovery processing, litigation support
and case management services).
74
U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
U.S. ATTORNEYS: LITIGATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICE CENTER 2, DEPT. OF JUST. (2009),
available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2014/05/22/pia_ltsc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B9EH-7HGK].
75
Id.

2019]

MANAGING DIGITAL DISCOVERY

251

formats including Concordance load files, CD/DVDs, and a secure intranet
repository (iConect) within the Department of Justice (DOJ) firewall.”76
Thanks to the discovery support provided by the LTSC, federal
prosecutors are much better equipped to store and manage digital evidence
than most of their state and local counterparts or defense attorneys.77 Yet
the growth of digital data may soon overwhelm even the capacities of
federal prosecutors, and certain mega cases have already tested the existing
support framework.78
On the other hand, for defense attorneys, who are frequently solo
practitioners without sophisticated technology, a production of multiple
gigabytes of data frequently exceeds the storage and backup capacity of
their office hardware.79 And despite the dramatic decrease of storage costs
for digital data generally, commercial storage for legal digital documents
remains expensive.80 Some experts believe that the high cost reflects the
complexity of managing the stored data;81 others suggest that it is driven by
demand for digital storage by well-heeled law firms handling large business
disputes.82 Whatever the reason, criminal defense attorneys often find it
76

Id.
Broderick, supra note 73 (discussing the disparity of e-discovery resources between
federal prosecutors and federal defense attorneys); see also Doucette, supra note 4, at 431
(noting that in Virginia, very few state prosecutors have electronic case-management
systems, “and the costs of such systems are prohibitive for many offices”).
78
Kirk Johnson, Charges Against Bundys in Ranch Standoff Case Are Dismissed, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/us/bundy-ranch-standoff-casecharges-dismissed.html [https://perma.cc/G9LS-QLUM] (discussing dismissal of charges for
Brady violations in case involving massive ESI); Kevin Krause, Judge in John Wiley Price
Trial Blasts Prosecution for ‘Improper Conduct,’ Reserves Right to Toss the Case, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2017/04/11/
judge-overseeing-john-wiley-price-corruption-trial-blasts-prosecution-improper-conduct
[https://perma.cc/PWB3-CJ6M] (discussing prosecutorial discovery failures in case with
massive ESI).
79
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 2014 WL 2574765, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. June 6,
2014) (“[A]ccess to the hard drives is limited and the size of the hard drives may force
counsel to upgrade their computer systems.”); Chris Raesz, File Safe, 46 VOICE FOR THE
DEFENSE 27 (TCDLA Dec. 2017).
80
John W.M. Claud, Responding to Defense Demands for Government Assistance in
Large ESI Criminal Cases, U.S. ATTYS’ BULL. 139, 145 (Jan. 2018); Broderick, supra note
73.
81
LaChapelle, supra note 72.
82
Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, Criminal Defense Attorney, Oct. 19, 2017, Dallas,
Texas. Stories of widely disparate storage estimates offered for the same case suggest that
some type of market failure might be at play. Broderick, supra note 73 (“In a multidefendant mortgage fraud case with over three terabytes (three trillion bytes) of data, the
cost of five vendor proposals for a web-hosted document review database ranged from
$70,000 to $1.7 million.”).
77
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prohibitively expensive to store and process voluminous digital evidence.83
In turn, this creates delays as defense attorneys try to obtain more favorable
rates from digital discovery vendors, additional funding from the court, or
more tailored discovery from the prosecution. Some defense attorneys end
up personally shouldering some of the costs of processing and reviewing
the evidence, without receiving full compensation for the review, and others
likely forgo adequate review of the evidence.84
To some degree, the problem of storage and management of digital
evidence can be solved by centralizing the service on the defense side, as is
already the case for federal prosecutors. Federal public defenders’ offices
are better positioned in this regard. In Dallas, the Office of the Federal
Public Defender pioneered a solution by buying a server of its own and
storing ESI in both its own cases and those of appointed defense
attorneys.85 Defense attorneys who have relied on this server estimate that
it has saved the federal government millions of dollars.86 At the national
level, the National Litigation Support Team for federal public defenders
and appointed counsel has also recently contracted with several vendors to
provide digital storage and processing services at discounted rates to
appointed counsel and public defenders.87 The Team also helps appointed
defense attorneys obtain competitive rates from other vendors that might
better meet the attorneys’ needs in particular cases.88 Yet even as the
federal Defender Services Office is building a more centralized digital
discovery infrastructure, retained counsel and counsel in state cases are still
left to navigate the digital storage problem on their own.
Apart from storage, the processing of digital discovery imposes heavy
burdens on the parties, particularly the defense. A typical ESI case is likely
to have files that originate from different sources and serve distinct
functions. The files are likely to be saved in multiple formats, many of
which require proprietary software to process and review.89 Processing the
83

See, e.g., Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82; Broderick, supra note 73.
CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 229.
85
Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82; Interview with Jason Hawkins,
Federal Public Defender, Northern District of Texas, Feb. 5, 2018.
86
Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82.
87
Defender Services Office, Litigation Services, CJA Panel Attorney Software
Discounts, https://fd.org/litigation-support/cja-panel-attorney-software-discounts [https://
perma.cc/5GNK-5DWV].
88
Defender Services Office, Litigation Services, Direct Assistance for CJA Panel,
https://fd.org/litigation-support/direct-assistance-cja-panel [https://perma.cc/LWV5-GRB4].
89
CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 227–28. Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra
note 82; This occurs frequently because prosecutors are “generally [ . . . ] not the original
custodian or source of the ESI they produce in discovery.” Joint Working Group On
84

2019]

MANAGING DIGITAL DISCOVERY

253

evidence can be expensive and time-consuming.90 As a result, disputes
frequently arise about the format in which files should be produced and
about the allocation of responsibility for any reformatting.91
Rules of criminal procedure remain silent on digital discovery
mechanics, leaving questions about formatting for the parties and the court
to decide on an ad hoc basis.92 Some courts have required the prosecution
to convert voluminous digital evidence into a searchable format, but others
have refused to impose such a burden on the prosecution in the absence of a
clear mandate from the rules.93 As a result, the defense may be left with
processing costs that it cannot fully meet.
Another important aspect of the formatting decision is whether the
recipient of the digital files—typically, the defense—would be able to view
the underlying metadata. To examine the metadata, a party would need to
receive the files in their native format. The producing party may therefore
need to produce the files in two formats—one that can be searched and one
that reveals the underlying characteristics of the data. The producing party
(typically, the prosecution) may receive files from a third party only in a
searchable format; to obtain the metadata, it would need to request the third
party to produce the same files in their native format, occasioning further
expense and delays.94 Some courts have therefore been reluctant to order
discovery of metadata, believing that metadata are generally not relevant
and too burdensome to produce.95 But as many civil case judges have
recognized, metadata are often needed to authenticate electronic documents,
understand key features of electronic files (such as the date and location of
their creation or modification), and sort electronic files (for example, by the
Electronic Technology in the Criminal Justice System, Recommendations for Electronically
Stored Information Discovery Production in Federal Criminal Cases, Rec. 6 (2012)
[hereinafter ESI Protocol].
90
See Broderick et al., supra note 45, at 9 (noting further that “there is no software tool
for producing all discovery in a single, easy-to-use package”).
91
See, e.g., State v. Dingman, 202 P.3d 388 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (reversing and
remanding for new trial where trial court refused to order prosecution to convert mirror
image of computer drive into a format usable by the defense).
92
See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 296 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that
Rule 16 “is entirely silent on the issue of the form that discovery must take”).
93
Andrew D. Goldsmith, Trends—or Lack Thereof—in Criminal E-Discovery: A
Pragmatic Survey of Recent Case Law, 59 U.S. ATTYS’ BULL. 2 (2011); Hilary Oran, Does
Brady Have Byte? Adapting Constitutional Disclosure for the Digital Age, 50 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 97, 118 (2016).
94
See, e.g., United States v. Budovsky, No. 13 CR 00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016).
95
Edward J. Imwinkelried & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Tactics for Attorney Seeking
Production, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY STRATEGY & TACTICS § 9:4 (2017).
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sender or recipient of emails).96 The information can be critical to a
criminal case, and courts have to determine when and how to distribute the
burden of its processing and review.
In brief, the staggering volume and complexity of digital evidence
requires significant technological expertise and resources to store and
process. In a cash-strapped criminal justice system, this frequently leaves
both parties—but especially the defense—unable to cope.
B. REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE

The next digital discovery challenge concerns the time and resources
needed to review ESI adequately. While keyword searches of digital
documents are generally quick and efficient, they are often imprecise, the
volume of digital evidence is overwhelming, and certain files, such as
images, audio, and video files, still require manual review. These
difficulties affect both the review of relevant evidence and, more
problematically, the review of potentially exculpatory evidence.
1. Reviewing Relevant Evidence
In some respects, digital documents are easier to review than paper
ones: Keyword searches enable an attorney to sift more quickly through a
batch of digital documents than a manual review of the same documents.
But keyword searching does not solve all problems of digital evidence
review. The exponential growth of ESI means that the universe of
documents to review is significantly larger than it was when evidence was
primarily saved in paper form. Moreover, keyword searching is not as
precise as it might initially appear. Search terms may be over- or underinclusive, particularly as text and social media messages increasingly use
symbols and abbreviations.97 Cases involving slang, code words, or
foreign-language conversations pose special challenges. Attorneys may not
be able to formulate the proper search terms unless they are familiar with
“the terms of art [and] the factual background of the case,” and they may
not know which search protocols to use unless they are technologically
savvy or have funding for search protocol experts (both of which are rare in
the field of criminal defense).98 When it comes to image, audio, and video
files, which are not searchable with currently available technology, the
96

Id.
Id. at § 9:13 (noting further that numerous studies have exposed the limits of keyword
searching).
98
Ken Strutin, Databases, E-Discovery and Criminal Law, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6, 28
(2009) (“Searchers must have insight into the language and terms of art, as well as the
factual background of the case, to even begin formulating the correct queries.”).
97
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burden on the defense is especially high.99 As a result of these various
challenges with reviewing ESI, defense attorneys frequently express
frustration at having to “sift[] through . . . terabytes of information.”100
Rules of criminal procedure do little to alleviate the disproportionate
burdens of reviewing digital evidence. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure require the prosecution to disclose documents that: 1) are
“material to preparing the defense”; 2) are intended for use in the
prosecution’s case-in-chief; or 3) have been obtained from a defendant.101
But the rules do not require the government to specify which of these three
categories the documents fall in, 102 and they do not require the prosecution
to identify where in a sizeable production the relevant documents are
located.103 Indictments also reveal little about the facts that might support
particular charges.104 In theory, the defense could move for a bill of
particulars or for “pinpoint discovery” to obtain more detailed information
about the case, but as long as prosecutors produce evidence in a searchable
format, courts are likely to deny such motions.105 Even if the prosecution
99
Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82; see also United States v. Richards,
659 F.3d 527, 544 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting defense “frustration about the sheer volume of
images and being ‘swamped with trying to pick the needle out of the haystack’”); United
States v. Quinones, 2015 WL 6696484, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2015) (acknowledging that
review of 3,240 hours of continuous video footage from pole camera would require defense
attorneys to invest thousands of hours); United States v. Sierra, 2012 WL 2866417, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (noting that pole camera videos are not searchable).
100
United States v. Vujanic, 2014 WL 3868448, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2014); see
also Richards, 659 F.3d at 544. Clients may sometimes be able to guide defense attorneys,
but even they are unlikely to provide a helpful roadmap when the evidence is in the millions
of pages. As Part IV.D discusses in greater detail, detained defendants face special
challenges in this process.
101
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (1)(a)(E).
102
See Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, Coming Changes to Federal Criminal
Discovery Rule?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 4, 2017.
103
Id.
104
Letter to Donald W. Molloy, U.S. District Judge, from Roland G. Riopelle, President,
NYCDL, Peter Goldberger and William Genego, Chairs, NACDL Federal Rules Committee
(Mar. 1, 2016) [hereinafter NYCDL and NACDL Letter].
105
See, e.g., United States v. Daugherty, 2017 WL 839472, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 28,
2017) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit has never recognized even extraordinarily dense or voluminous
discovery as a justification to order a bill of particulars.”); United States v. Huntress, 2015
WL 631976, at *28 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2015) (denying a motion for a bill of particulars
where the prosecution “produced 137,000 pages of discovery on DVDs that are ‘readily
loadable into a searchable format’ and accompanied by an index of these materials”); see
also United States v. Gonzalez, 2014 WL 2574765, at **1–4 (E.D. Tenn. June 6, 2014)
(denying motion for pinpoint discovery where the prosecution had taken measures to make
voluminous discovery more manageable and where pinpoint discovery was not compelled
by law). But cf. United States v. Chen, 2006 WL 3898177, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2006)
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has created a tool that could help with review of the evidence (for example,
a computer program or database that can sort through voluminous records),
courts will generally deny discovery of such government-created tools, as
long as the prosecution provides the underlying records to the defense.106
As a result, defense attorneys can easily become overwhelmed by a
“discovery dump” in a voluminous ESI case, as a letter from the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to the Federal Rules Committee
explained:
It is now routine in many jurisdictions for defense counsel to receive enormous
amounts of information at the outset of the discovery process, with relatively little
guidance as to what might be relevant to the prosecution or defense of the charges
contained in the indictment . . . . [D]efense counsel are often handed a computer
hard drive at the first appearance in court, and told that it contains the
government’s first production of discovery, consisting of millions of pages of
documentation and thousands of emails culled from the server of a client’s
employer. Thousands more pages of documentation and emails typically follow
that first production, and occasionally, more gigabytes of documentation will be
dropped into defense counsel’s laps on the eve of trial.107

When prosecutors turn over voluminous digital evidence without any
guidance on where documents material to the case might be located,
defense attorneys find it difficult to review the evidence and provide
adequate assistance to clients in plea negotiations or at trial.
2. Searching for Brady Evidence
The expansion of digital evidence also has implications for how
prosecutors fulfill their constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory and
impeachment evidence to the defense. Under Brady v. Maryland and its
progeny, prosecutors have a duty to review evidence within their possession
carefully to ensure that they have disclosed every item that might be
exculpatory or impeachment evidence and material to the defense.108
Prosecutors also have a duty to learn of Brady evidence known to anyone

(granting motion for bill of particulars where discovery included thousands of nonsearchable image, audio, and video files).
106
United States v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1282 (10th Cir. 2010); see also United States
v. McCluskey, 2012 WL 13081295 (D.N.M. May 11, 2012); United States v. Schmidt, 2007
WL 1232180 (D. Colo. Apr. 25, 2007).
107
NYCDL and NACDL Letter, supra note 104; see also Anello & Albert, supra note
102 (“[T]he ubiquity and growth in volume of electronically stored information have
exacerbated another longstanding problem: government follow-up productions of large
quantities of new material on the eve of trial.”).
108
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963).
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on the government’s investigative team and to disclose that evidence to the
defense.109
In cases with massive digital or documentary evidence, prosecutors
often turn over all the evidence to the defense to ensure that they have not
mistakenly withheld any Brady evidence. When this occurs, courts have
held that the burden of searching for Brady evidence within the gigabytes of
files produced by the prosecution rests entirely with the defense.110 The
prosecution has no duty to indicate where within a voluminous production
Brady evidence might be located. Some courts have suggested that Brady
requires the prosecution to at least ensure that digital evidence is provided
in a searchable format and that the ESI production is not padded “with
pointless or superfluous information to frustrate a defendant’s review.”111
But only a few courts have gone further and required the prosecution to
specifically identify Brady material within a large mass of ESI
documents.112
As the previous section discussed, reviewing massive digital evidence
remains a time-consuming and onerous task. With respect to images, video,
and audio files, the reviewing burden is even greater. Given the limited
resources of most defense attorneys, relevant evidence may be
overlooked.113 This undermines the accuracy of criminal adjudication and
the public interest in uncovering the truth in criminal cases. When the
relevant evidence is potentially exculpatory, the fairness of the trial is also
compromised, and the problem assumes constitutional dimensions. Yet
109

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995).
See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 297 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that
the prosecution “is under no duty to direct a defendant to exculpatory evidence within a
larger mass of disclosed evidence”); Oran, supra note 93, at 118 (discussing cases).
111
United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 577 (5th Cir. 2009); see also United States v.
Quinones, 2015 WL 6696484, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2015) (discussing cases and noting
that “courts have started to recognize that the Government needs to impose at least some
minimal organization on voluminous discovery to comply with the spirit of its statutory and
constitutional obligations”).
112
E.g., United States v. Blankenship, 2015 WL 3687864 (S.D.W. Va. June 12, 2015);
United States v. Salyer, 2010 WL 3036444, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010) (ordering
identification of Brady material for a detained defendant with limited resources “as a matter
of case management (and fairness)”); United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 14, 29 (D.D.C.
1998).
113
While so far, courts do not appear to have granted an ineffective assistance claim on
the grounds that counsel failed to adequately review voluminous discovery, such claims are
made with regularity by defendants. See, e.g., Martinez v. United States, 2018 WL 3024155,
at *3 (D.S.C. June 18, 2018) (rejecting claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance by
not thoroughly reviewing voluminous evidence); Johnson v. United States, 2015 WL
7169589, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2015) (same); Bieganowski v. United States, 2006 WL
2259710, at **10, 22 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2006) (same).
110

258

TURNER

[Vol. 109

neither case law nor criminal procedure rules have adequately addressed the
challenges for the defense in searching for exculpatory evidence within
gigabytes of electronic documents—and how these can be resolved without
imposing impractical burdens on the prosecution.
In certain cases, the intersection of the prosecution’s duty under Brady
and its duty to protect sensitive information does impose a significant
reviewing burden on the prosecution. If prosecutors decide to withhold
evidence to protect the safety of a witness or to safeguard privileged
information, they need to examine the protected material carefully to ensure
that it does not contain Brady evidence. As explained earlier, this often
requires manual review in addition to keyword searching of documents, and
for images, video, and audio files, it always demands time-consuming
personal review.114 Not surprisingly, some cases that are heavy on both ESI
and protected information have led to Brady violations by prosecutors.115
Another complication for prosecutors is that ESI comes from a range
of sources and may be stored with multiple law enforcement agencies
working on the case or in different locations within the same agency. As
noted previously, prosecutors are responsible for disclosing Brady evidence
in the custody of law enforcement, even if they are not aware that such
evidence exists.116 Some prosecutors argue that it is more difficult to
comply with this duty in ESI cases because the evidence is so voluminous
and law enforcement agencies’ digital storage practices are frequently
disorganized and inconsistent.117

114
Quinones, 2015 WL 6696484, at *3 (ordering annotation of videos produced where
prosecution produced around 3,240 hours of continuous pole camera footage); United States
v. Sierra, 2012 WL 2866417, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (noting that pole camera videos
are not searchable); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 2014 WL 2574765, at *1 (E.D.
Tenn. June 6, 2014) (rejecting defense motion for pinpoint discovery in a drug-trafficking
conspiracy case involving thousands of audio- and video-recorded conversations in
Spanish); United States v. Flores, 2014 WL 1308608, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014)
(noting the time-consuming nature of discovery review in RICO gang case involving
hundreds of thousands of documents, 15,800 audio recordings, and 100 videos, many of
which were heavily redacted to protect the safety of witnesses).
115
Transcript, United States v. Bundy, Docket No. 2:16-CR-00046 (D. Nev. Jan. 8,
2018),
at
https://www.scribd.com/document/369154834/Transcript-Jan-8-2018
[https://perma.cc/KR7H-28F4]; see also United States v. Bundy, Government’s Brief
Opposing Dismissal with Prejudice, Docket No. 2:16-CR-00046 (D. Nev. Feb 17, 2016).
116
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995).
117
Interview with Assistant District Attorney, Texas, Feb. 1, 2018 (noting that under
discovery rules, prosecutors have to account for digital police files, but prosecutors don’t
have a say over how police organize and store their videos; as a result, police might have it
in several places, and some of the evidence might not make it to the prosecutor in time to be
properly disclosed).

2019]

MANAGING DIGITAL DISCOVERY

259

C. PROTECTING PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND SAFETY

Where a case features information that might compromise witness or
informant safety, individual privacy, trade secrets, national security, or a
legal privilege, attorneys have to review the information carefully to ensure
that it is adequately safeguarded. Most commonly, this is a problem for the
prosecution. But the defense also has legal obligations to protect certain
private or confidential information when producing its own ESI.
Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, like Texas, the burden has been shifted
from the prosecution to defense counsel to redact private and confidential
information before sharing it with the defendant.118 While this helps ensure
broader access to relevant information for the defense, in cases with
voluminous ESI, it also imposes a significant reviewing and redacting
burden on defense attorneys.
Once prosecutors or defense counsel have located the information that
should be protected from disclosure, they must also determine how the
sensitive information should be safeguarded. The parties may need to
discuss with each other any protective orders or other measures that may be
necessary to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive ESI material.119
Sensitive and confidential documents may include: “grand jury material,
witness identifying information, information about informants, a
defendant’s or co-defendant’s personal or business information, information
subject to court protective orders, confidential personal or business
information, or privileged information.”120
In cases involving child pornography, the parties will also need to
determine how to conduct discovery without violating laws criminalizing
the distribution of the material.121 If the law criminalizes copying of child
118
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 39.14(f) (2017) (providing that defense attorney must redact
personal identifying information, such as address, telephone number, driver’s license
number, social security number, date of birth, and bank account number, before sharing with
the defendant).
119
ESI Protocol, supra note 89, rec. 10. To that end, the parties may need to discuss
whether “encryption or other security measures during transmission of ESI discovery are
warranted” and what measures would be taken “to ensure that only authorized persons have
access to the electronically stored or disseminated discovery materials” and “to ensure the
security of any website or other electronic repository against unauthorized access,” among
other issues. Id.
120
Id.
121
18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(1)–(2)(A) (2018) (requiring that child pornography “remain in
the care, custody, and control of either the Government or the court” and that
“[n]otwithstanding Rule 16 . . . a court shall deny . . . any request by the defendant to copy,
photograph, duplicate, or otherwise reproduce any property or material that constitutes child
pornography . . . so long as the Government makes the property or material reasonably
available to the defendant”).
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pornography even for purposes of discovery (as it does at the federal level),
the prosecution will typically make the images available to the defense for
inspection at the prosecutor’s office or other law enforcement facility.122
But in states where no law criminalizes copying of child pornography for
purposes of discovery, and discovery rules require the prosecution to
furnish a copy of the relevant images to the defense upon request,123 other
measures are needed to protect against unauthorized access. The parties
may enter into stipulations, or the prosecution may obtain protective orders
that require the defense to safeguard the material from any improper
distribution or viewing.124
Adequate handling of the security of confidential and sensitive
evidence—to prevent cyber intrusions and other forms of unauthorized
access—often requires specialized technical knowledge, which prosecutors
and defense attorneys are not likely to have on their own.125 And while
prosecutors may be able to rely on in-house information technology
specialists to handle these questions, private defense attorneys are unlikely
to have such experts on staff. As a result, the question of who should bear
the burden of ensuring the security, privacy, and confidentiality of the
information is frequently disputed. It requires good faith negotiation
between the parties, and as Part VI elaborates, judicial supervision guided
by robust rules on digital discovery.
D. OBTAINING EVIDENCE FROM THIRD PARTIES

Another complication of digital discovery is that the defense faces
serious challenges in obtaining electronically stored information that is not
already in the prosecution’s custody.
Defendants must overcome
significant legal hurdles in obtaining subpoenas for documents held by third
parties. Furthermore, individuals or entities who are not parties to the case
may be reluctant, unavailable, or in some cases legally prohibited from
sharing the evidence with the defense. The difficulty of gathering digital
122
See, e.g., United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 731 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that
“[c]hild pornography is illegal contraband” and that therefore Rule 16 does not provide for
the distribution or copying of the material by the defense); United States v. Husband, 246 F.
Supp. 2d 467, 469 (E.D. Va. 2003) (same); State v. Ross, 792 So. 2d 699, 701–02 (Fla. App.
2001) (same).
123
See State v. Scoles, 69 A.3d 559, 571 (N.J. 2013) (“A majority of states that have
considered whether to incorporate the federal approach have determined not to do so, opting
in favor of procedures requiring the prosecution to reproduce the materials for defendant’s
use and control in the preparation of a defense.”).
124
Susan S. Kreston, Emerging Issues in Internet Child Pornography Cases: Balancing
Acts, 9 J. INTERNET L. 22, 28 (2006); see also Scoles, 69 A.3d 559.
125
See, e.g., CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 228.
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evidence from third parties worsens the informational asymmetry between
the prosecution and defense.
To obtain digital evidence from a third party before trial, the defense
first has to apply to the district court to subpoena the material; even if the
subpoena is granted, the person or entity to whom it is addressed can still
move to quash it.126 Only if the defense succeeds at both stages will the
subpoena be enforced.
Courts are split on the standards that apply to subpoenas for
documentary evidence, known as subpoenas duces tecum. A few merely
require the defense to show that the information requested may be “material
to the defense” and is not unduly oppressive for the requested party to
produce.127 But other courts demand that the defense meet the stricter
standard under United States v. Nixon, which was developed for subpoenas
used by prosecutors and requires the moving party to show:
(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise
procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the
party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in
advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend
unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith
and is not intended as a general ‘fishing expedition.’128

Following Nixon, many federal courts have limited the type of
evidence that the defense may obtain through a subpoena duces tecum,
holding that it may not use a subpoena to gather “pretrial materials that are
sought solely ‘for purposes of impeachment.’”129 Other courts have
quashed subpoenas that were perceived as overly broad.130 State courts
have used similar requirements to constrain the types of evidence that the
defense can subpoena from private parties.131
126
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c); Alan Silber & Lin Solomon, A Creative Approach for
Obtaining Documentary Evidence from Third Parties, CHAMPION, May 2017, at 24, 25. For
state rules, see, for example, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1326 (2008); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 17(a)(2).
127
See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 249 F.R.D. 58, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). See generally
Silber & Solomon, supra note 126, at 26.
128
418 U.S. 683, 699–700 (1974).
129
United States v. Baroni, 2015 WL 9049528, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2015) (citing
United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 195 (3d Cir. 1981) and United States v.
Onyenson, 2013 WL 5322651, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2013)).
130
United States v. Rand, 835 F.3d 451, 462–64 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying Nixon criteria
to uphold district court decision to quash subpoena requesting “accounting entries, budgets,
budget entries, and financial reports for seven categories of reserve accounts over an eightyear period — the timeframe of the alleged conspiracy” because the request was overly
broad).
131
See, e.g., State v. Watson, 726 A.2d 214, 216 (Me. 1999) (quoting United States v.
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 145 (3rd Cir. 1980)); In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind.
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In some circumstances, the law may impose additional burdens on the
defense’s efforts to obtain digital information from private parties. Trade
secret protections represent one such hurdle, particularly in cases involving
algorithms or computer programs used to investigate or prosecute
defendants. If a private party owns the source code for these computer
programs, trade secrets may make it difficult and in some cases impossible
for the defense to gain access to the source code.132 This may prevent
defendants from questioning the reliability of the digital technology used to
prosecute them, whether that technology is fingerprint matching, DNA
matching, ballistic matching, or breathalyzers.133 Trade secrets may also
impede defendants from obtaining the algorithms behind digital
surveillance programs, limiting the defense’s ability to challenge the
legality of the surveillance.134
Likewise, state and federal privacy laws may prevent private parties
from sharing certain digital evidence with the defense. The Stored
Communications Act (SCA) prohibits service providers from disclosing the
electronic communications of their clients without either the consent of the
client or a subpoena, court order, or warrant obtained by a governmental
entity.135 Because the defendant—even when represented by a public
defender—is not a governmental entity, he cannot subpoena Internet service
providers for emails or other electronic communications material to the
defense’s case.
When the SCA prevents the service provider from disclosing the
evidence to the defense, the defense could still subpoena the records
1998) (requiring, among else, that the evidence sought be described with particularity and
that it be material to the defense, that “the information is not readily available elsewhere”
and “that the party seeking it is not engaged in a fishing expedition with no focused idea of
the size, species, or edibility of the fish”); Cty. of Nassau Police Dep’t v. Judge, 237 A.D.2d
354, 355 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (quashing subpoena because “respondent has
offered nothing of a particularized nature which would support the claim that the requested
materials will bear relevant and exculpatory evidence” and holding that “a subpoena may not
be used to ‘fish for impeaching material’”); Peter Hershey, Discovering Electronically
Stored Information in Maryland Criminal Cases, MD. B.J., Nov./Dec. 2014, at 50. But cf.
Harris v. State, 802 S.E.2d 708, 711 (Ga. App. Ct. 2017) (noting that to obtain subpoena,
defendant must merely establish that documents sought are relevant and material to the
defense and not unduly oppressive to produce).
132
E.g., People v. Super. Ct. (“Chubbs”), 2015 WL 139069 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2015).
For a discussion of this case and the broader problem of trade secrets preventing the
disclosure of evidence to criminal defendants, see Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade
Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018).
133
Meghan J. Ryan, Secret Conviction Programs, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2020); Wexler, supra note 132, at 1343, 1358–64.
134
Wexler, supra note 132, at 1364–68.
135
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2703 (2012) (emphasis added).
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directly from the senders or recipients of the relevant electronic
communications.136 But there are several difficulties with this approach.
First, as discussed earlier, the defense may be limited in using subpoenas to
obtain evidence from private parties—subpoenas cannot be used merely to
gather impeachment evidence, the information sought must be specific and
material to the defense, and the defense must show that other methods of
obtaining the evidence are not reasonably available.137 It is therefore by no
means certain that the defense would be able to obtain or enforce a
subpoena.138
Second, even if the defense were able to obtain a subpoena, the
senders or recipients of the electronic communications—particularly if they
are prosecution witnesses—may be reluctant to cooperate with the defense.
Those who have the resources to hire an attorney may resist the subpoena
through a motion to quash or modify its scope. Even when such litigation
is not successful, it burdens the defense and drains its resources. Other
witnesses may be open to complying, but may have difficulties doing so, as
they may not be able to hire lawyers or technical experts to guide them in
the process.139 To aid in this process, the court may order the private party
to consent to disclosure by the Internet Service Provider; however, this is an
area of the law that is still developing, and not all courts may realize or
agree that they have this authority.140 Finally, if the senders or recipients of
the electronic communications are unavailable, the defense may be left with
no legal recourse to the data.141
136
State v. Johnson, 538 S.W.3d 32, 70 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 2016); see also FED. R.
CRIM P. 17(c).
137
See supra notes 126–131 and accompanying text.
138
As noted earlier, the defense may have to litigate the subpoena at two stages: when
the court first decides whether to issue the subpoena, and if the subpoenaed party files a
motion to quash, when responding to the motion. See supra note 126 and accompanying
text.
139
Cf. Johnson, 538 S.W.3d at 71 (recognizing burdens on witnesses, but finding that in
the case at hand, subpoenas to witnesses were not unduly onerous).
140
See Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (Touchstone), 15 Cal. App. 5th 729, 746 (Ct. App.
2017). The case is currently being considered by the California Supreme Court, and one of
the questions presented is: “Does the trial court have authority, pursuant to statutory and/or
inherent power to control litigation before it and to insure fair proceedings, to order the
victim witness (or any other listed witness), on pain of sanctions, to either (a) comply with a
subpoena served on him or her, seeking disclosure of the sought communications subject to
in camera review and any appropriate protective or limiting conditions, or (b) consent to
disclosure by provider Facebook subject to in camera review and any appropriate protective
or limiting conditions?” Facebook, Inc. v. S.C. (Touchstone), 408 P.3d 406 (Cal. 2018).
141
Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443, 445 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2015),
review granted and opinion superseded sub nom. Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (Hunter), 362
P.3d 430 (Cal. 2015); Andrew Cohen, How Social Media Giants Side with Prosecutors in
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While the defense has to abide by strict subpoena requirements in
gathering digital evidence from private parties, and often faces additional
legal and practical difficulties in obtaining such evidence, the prosecution
retains significantly broader investigative authority. It can collect a wide
range of evidence from third parties through grand jury subpoenas, as well
as through searches and seizures. Because of the superior investigative
authority of the prosecution, when the defense comes up short in its efforts
to gather the information from third parties, its only option might be to
request the prosecution to assist it in obtaining the information.142 But the
defense may be reluctant to do this out of concern about revealing its trial
strategy. Furthermore, the prosecution has no legal duty to assist the
defense in obtaining such evidence, so a request may remain unanswered.143
The imbalance of investigative powers in obtaining evidence from
private parties exacerbates the broader informational and resource
disparities between the defense and prosecution in criminal cases. As
subsequent sections discuss, in the interests of justice and due process,
courts may occasionally need to intervene to help the defense in obtaining
digital evidence in the hands of private parties.
E. PROVIDING DIGITAL DISCOVERY TO DETAINED DEFENDANTS

Another important challenge for defense attorneys handling digital
discovery in criminal cases is that their client may be prevented from
helping them review digital documents if he or she is detained. In a case
with voluminous electronic documents, consultation with the client is
especially important to help the attorney prepare for trial in a timely and

Criminal Cases, Jan. 15, 2018, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/01/15/how-socialmedia-giants-side-with-prosecutors-in-criminal-cases [https://perma.cc/A6XM-BQY7]. The
defendant may also be left without access to the ESI if the account holder invokes her
privilege against self-incrimination when asked to authenticate an electronic communication.
Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (Hunter), Real Parties Lee Sullivan and Derrick Hunter’s
Opening Brief on the Merits, 2016 WL 284305, at *5 (Jan. 15, 2016).
142
Cf. Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 417 P.3d 725, 731 (Cal. 2018) (noting that social
media service providers encouraged defendants to “work[] with the prosecutor to obtain” the
requested ESI via search warrant).
143
See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 648 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
prosecution “had no duty to . . . conduct the defense’s investigation for it” and thus no duty
to direct third party “to create and run programs to extract data from its database that would
be useful to the defense”); United States v. Baker, 1 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1993)
(“Certainly, Brady does not require the government to conduct discovery on behalf of the
defendant.”); United States v. Lujan, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (D.N.M. 2008) (noting that
the prosecution does not have a duty “to seek out information that is not in its or its agents’
possession”).
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adequate fashion.144 The client’s input is needed both to assess evidence
disclosed by the prosecution and to review evidence that the defense needs
to produce.145
Yet detention centers limit inmates’ access to computers and the
Internet, and this hampers the ability of detained defendants to review
digital documents relevant to their case.146 These limitations are based in
part on financial constraints and in part on concerns about security.147
Because of the restrictions on computer and Internet use by inmates,
defense attorneys typically bring their own computers to the detention
center when they meet with clients.148 This approach, however, is
cumbersome, inadequate, and inefficient. It is cumbersome because the
defense attorneys may have to have their laptops “certified” for use in the
detention centers.149 It is inadequate because it leaves inmates with very
limited time to review documents.150 And it is inefficient because it
requires counsel to travel to the detention center and then spend hours there
for the client to read through massive files.
Consider the difficulties experienced by the defense in United States v.
Henderson, where the defendant and his counsel had to compete with other
attorneys for one of three meeting rooms, and visiting hours were “limited
to three hours per evening, five days per week.” 151 When Henderson and
his counsel were able to claim a room, the visits consisted of counsel
“watching defendant while he reads one document at a time.”152

144

Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82.
John McEnany & Donna Lee Elm, Delivering E-Discovery to Federal Pretrial
Detainees, 32 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2017, at 49, 59 (noting that “the defense may produce
sizeable e-discovery as well that its client must review” and that this poses special problems
because detention facilities want to accept discovery only from the government as a result of
security concerns).
146
Id. at 49 (noting that many detention facilities have a policy against Internet access
and have security concerns about providing computer access to unattended detainees).
147
Id. (noting concerns that “almost any device introduced into the facility could be
weaponized” and concerns about the personnel needed to escort detainees to and from
discovery review rooms, as well as to log, distribute, and maintain digital devices).
148
Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82; Interview with Jason Hawkins,
supra note 85.
149
Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82; Interview with Jason Hawkins,
supra note 85.
150
See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 2016 WL 7377118, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 20,
2016); McEnany & Elm, supra note 145, at 49.
151
Henderson, 2016 WL 7377118, at *3.
152
Id. To address the problem, the court granted the defendant’s request to permit the
defendant to “retain copies of non-victim, substantive witness interview reports only.” Id. at
*4.
145
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Recognizing the persistent difficulties that cases with ESI and pretrial
detainees present, in 2016, the Joint Electronic Technology Working Group
(a group of federal prosecutors, defense attorneys, and magistrate judges
charged with developing best practices to the management of digital
discovery) published Guidance for the Provision of ESI to Detainees.153
The group failed to come up with a definitive solution to the problem of
delivering digital discovery to detainees. It acknowledged that detention
centers have varying capacities to accommodate review of digital evidence
and that inmates have different needs based on the size and complexity of
digital evidence in their cases.154 Accordingly, the Guidance simply urged
“a spirit of cooperation.”155 To facilitate such cooperation, the Guidance
authors proposed the creation of “points of contact” in each of the
institutions involved (defense, prosecution, Marshals Service, jail, and the
court).156 The Guidance recommended that these persons work as a
committee to develop best practices for providing digital discovery to
detainees and then to negotiate solutions on a case-by-case basis as
needed.157
V. NEGOTIATING CRIMINAL DISCOVERY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
A. NEGOTIATION PRACTICE

As discussed earlier, rules of criminal procedure are generally silent on
digital discovery obligations in criminal cases. Courts have also been
relatively slow to address the concerns raised by digital evidence. As a
result, the parties have responded to the complexity, volume, and cost of
digital discovery primarily by negotiating solutions with each other. This
Part provides examples of the forms that such cooperation can take, then
analyzes the incentives of prosecutors and defense attorneys to cooperate in
digital discovery, as well as the limits to such cooperation.
Several sources suggest that cooperation and negotiation about digital
discovery is already occurring in criminal cases. First, published and
unpublished judicial opinions provide some evidence of cooperation.
While such opinions are typically issued when negotiations between the
parties fail (hence the need for the court to intervene), the description of the
interactions preceding the dispute often recounts cooperative behavior.

153
154
155
156
157

McEnany & Elm, supra note 145, at 49.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
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For example, in United States v. Farkas, a securities fraud case
involving “monumental discovery,” the appeals court found that the district
court had not abused its discretion in denying a fourth motion for a
continuance of the trial.158 In justifying this conclusion, the appeals court
noted that the “[g]overnment had provided considerable assistance to
defense counsel in reviewing documentary discovery production, including
instituting an open file policy and holding regular meetings.”159
Likewise, in United States v. Shafer, which involved 200 terabytes
seized from 600 computers and 10,000 pieces of paper, prosecutors
“provided searchable copies of certain documents and [] met individually
with counsel for the defendants to recommend where counsel [sic] focus
their review efforts. For example, the government [] suggested which hard
drive or drives counsel should search. Defense attorneys [were] also []
provided copies of the electronic storage devices.”160 The court pointed to
this assistance as a reason for denying a defense motion for pinpoint
discovery (i.e., a motion for the government to pinpoint data relevant to the
case).161
Similarly, in United States v. Santiago, a case concerning cocaine
trafficking in Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico, the government produced,
inter alia, audio copies of 1,329 intercepted Spanish-language calls
pertinent to the charges, as well as electronic copies of English-language
written summaries of those calls. The government further offered to
provide electronic copies of English-language verbatim transcripts of the
approximately 200 calls it intended to offer at trial.162 The prosecution
refused to provide such transcripts for the remaining 1,129 pertinent calls,
however, until finally ordered by the court.163 This case lends support to
the idea that cooperation is more likely to occur in the shadow of judicial
intervention, a point discussed further below in Part V.B.
In United States v. Shabudin, the prosecution provided the defense
with access to a government-created database containing ESI relevant to the
case and access to project managers who could assist the defense with the
database.164 Scores of other cases point to various efforts by the

158
159
160
161
162
163
164

United States v. Farkas, 474 F. App’x 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id.
United States v. Shafer, 2011 WL 977891, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2011).
Id.
United States v. Santiago, 2013 WL 1688865, at *12–13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2013).
Id. at *13.
United States v. Shabudin, 2014 WL 1379717 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2014).
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prosecution to help the defense process voluminous ESI.165 Some also offer
examples of judges prodding the parties to confer about digital discovery.166
Another source suggesting a turn toward cooperation is the ESI
Protocol, developed by a joint working group of federal prosecutors and
public defenders to address the challenges of digital evidence. The Protocol
promotes a “collaborative approach to ESI discovery involving mutual and
interdependent responsibilities.”167 It recommends that the parties meet and
confer to discuss “the nature, volume, and mechanics of producing ESI
discovery.”168 It also encourages the parties to “make good faith efforts to
discuss and resolve disputes over ESI discovery . . . before seeking judicial
resolution of an ESI discovery dispute.”169 Although the ESI Protocol is
not yet well-known among practitioners and is therefore rarely followed, its
recommendations reflect a belief by federal prosecutors and defense
attorneys that cooperation by the parties is not only possible, but also
desirable to manage the intricacies of digital discovery in criminal cases.
When the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules recently discussed
and adopted amendments to the federal rules to address digital discovery,
consensus again developed around a collaborative approach. Defense
attorneys, prosecutors, and judges who took part in the Committee’s
165
See, e.g., United States v. Meredith, 2015 WL 5570033, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22,
2015) (noting that the prosecution provided the defendant with term-searchable discovery, a
separate hard drive containing document and email files from imaged hard drives, and
“written and oral assistance in regard to finding specific documents . . . including a colorcoded and categorized Media Review Index”); United States v. Mohammad, 2012 WL
1605472, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 8, 2012) (noting that the prosecution provided the defense
with a hard drive containing ESI in searchable format with indices and with instructions on
how to navigate the hard drive to review the discovery); United States v. Slade, 2011 WL
5291757, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2011) (detailing several attempts by prosecution to assist
the defense with voluminous ESI); see also Claud, supra note 80, at 139.
166
United States v. Haymond, 2009 WL 3029592, at **3–4 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 16, 2009)
(in mediating dispute about sizeable discovery of alleged child pornography, the court
directed the prosecution to produce additional redacted images for use by the defendant at
government facility and urged the parties to cooperate in order to expedite any additional
digital discovery). Cf. General Order Regarding Best Practices for Electronic Discovery of
Documentary Materials in Criminal Cases, G.O. 09-05, at 1 (W.D. Okla. 2009) (noting that
“[o]pen communication between the government and defense counsel is critical to ensure
that discovery is handled and completed in a manner agreeable to all parties”); N.J. CT. R.
3:9–1(c) (requiring prosecutor and defense counsel to “confer and attempt to reach
agreement on any discovery issues, including any issues pertaining to discovery provided
through the use of CD, DVD, e-mail, internet or other electronic means”).
167
ESI Protocol, supra note 89.
168
Id. at principle 3 (“At the outset of a case, the parties should meet and confer about
the nature, volume, and mechanics of producing ESI discovery. Where the ESI discovery is
particularly complex or produced on a rolling basis, an ongoing dialogue may be helpful.”).
169
Id. at principle 9.
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deliberations noted that a cooperative approach has worked in a number of
cases, when the parties have relied on the ESI Protocol or when the judge
has prodded the parties to meet and confer.170 Participants therefore
lamented that not enough prosecutors and defense attorneys were aware of
the ESI Protocol.171 They further reported that “once the parties get
together and actually consult the ESI Protocol, discovery goes very
smoothly.”172 Furthermore, defense attorneys, who were the stakeholders
most vocal about the challenges of e-discovery, “strongly supported the
idea that the parties know the case better than the court does.”173
Participants at the Committee meeting generally agreed that the parties
“ought to take the first look at the case and talk to each other about whether
the case warrants some departure from the rules that would normally
apply.”174
After extensive consultation and discussion, committee members
concluded that the best approach to digital discovery in criminal cases is not
more detailed regulation, but rather encouragement of negotiations among
the parties.175 Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1 therefore
mandates that the parties meet and confer about discovery shortly after
arraignment.176 At this meeting, the parties would discuss common digital
discovery challenges, such as the type and format of discovery and the
timeline for production. If the parties anticipate that discovery will take a
long time to review, they may request the court to grant them a continuance
to prepare adequately for trial.177
Conversations with several state and federal practitioners in Dallas
confirm that informal discussions and negotiations about the scope, format,
170

Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, Sept. 19, 2016, at 11, in Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2017, at 29 (“Complex
cases come to [a judge’s] attention regularly by motions, filed primarily by defense
attorneys, asking him to designate a case as complex for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act.
The motion is invariably accompanied by a request for a case management conference. [The
judge] orders the parties to work this out, they provide their agreement, and he tweaks a
bit.”).
171
Beale and King Memorandum, supra note 1, at 167.
172
Id. at 168.
173
Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, April 28, 2017, at 20, in Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., October 24, 2017, at 38.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 24 (“[D]efense attorneys at the mini conference expressed concern that they
were not able to get Assistant U.S. Attorneys to talk to them, and that they needed some sort
of push from the rules.”).
176
See Draft Rule 16.1, supra note 22.
177
Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, April 28, 2017, at 23, in Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., October 24, 2017, at 41.
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and timing of digital discovery are common in cases with massive digital
evidence.178 As one defense attorney explained, “Once we get together,
we’re wading into the problem; parties are generally agreeable. Everyone
is just taken aback by how long it’s taking.”179
B. COOPERATION INCENTIVES

Legal scholarship has long recognized that criminal law practice is not
purely adversarial, but rather has significant cooperative aspects.180 A wellknown 1970s study by James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob of felony case
dispositions in three U.S. cities famously concluded that “negotiation is the
most commonly used technique in criminal courtrooms.”181 As the authors
explained, “continuances and the date of hearings are often bargained; the
exchange of information is also commonly negotiated.”182 Other empirical
studies have also found frequent cooperation and negotiation between the
prosecution and the defense on a host of procedural questions in criminal
cases.183 These studies conclude that prosecutors and defense attorneys

178

All but one of the interviews for this project were conducted in person in Dallas,
where the author is based. Dallas is a fitting place to explore the challenges of digital
discovery because its federal courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys handle many
complex cases featuring large amounts of digital discovery and have had to devise solutions
to the problems that have arisen. The storage and processing of digital data at the Federal
Public Defender’s Office, discussed earlier, is one such pioneering solution.
179
Interview with Jason Hawkins, supra note 85; see also CARDONE REPORT, supra note
71, at 229 (noting that “[m]any U.S. Attorneys work with defense attorneys to ensure that
discovery is produced in accessible, searchable formats”).
180
See, e.g., MALCOLM FEELEY, PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 270–74 (1979); MILTON
HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS 84, 90–91, 117–26 (1977) (describing how new defense attorneys and
prosecutors over time adopt a less adversarial and more cooperative posture); Abraham S.
Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a
Profession, 1 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 15, 24 (1967); Jenny Roberts & Ronald F.
Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1445, 1475 (2016) (noting that
“the repeat-player nature of the relationships in criminal law practice-working together in
one courthouse, over and over-may move some aspects of the negotiation away from
competitive to a necessarily more cooperative strategy”); Jackson B. Battle, Comment, In
Search of the Adversary System—The Cooperative Practices of Private Criminal Defense
Attorneys, 50 TEX. L. REV. 60, 111–12 (1971).
181
JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 32 (1977).
182
Id.
183
See, e.g., HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 84–91; Alschuler, supra note 26, at 56; Battle,
supra note 180, at 67; Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Cooperating or Caving in: Are Defense
Attorneys Shrewd or Exploited in Plea Bargaining Negotiations?, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 145
(2007).
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cooperate and negotiate to resolve cases more rapidly,184 to reduce
uncertainty,185 and to maintain friendly relations in a field of repeat
players.186 In interviews, defense attorneys have admitted that contacts and
relationships with other criminal justice actors are at least as important as
knowing the law.187 As one defense attorney averred, “Your relationships
with the D.A.’s office will help a hundred times out of a hundred.”188 To
retain that good relationship and the benefits that come with it, defense
attorneys frequently refrain from aggressive litigation tactics and instead
turn to cooperation and accommodation.189
While the cooperative aspects of criminal law practice in general are
well-recognized, discovery itself is often described as an adversarial
competition—a game of hide and seek.190 A few scholars have recognized,
however, that cooperation also occurs with respect to discovery, typically as
part of the broader give and take of plea bargaining. Discovery concessions
may be granted by prosecutors to receive a guilty plea or cooperation from
the defendant and by defense attorneys to obtain more lenient treatment in
the case.191 Discovery favors may also be exchanged more broadly to
demonstrate reasonableness and maintain friendly relations in repeat-player
relationships.192
184

EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 181, at 32; FEELEY, supra note 180, at 271–72.
EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 181, at 32.
186
Id. at 33; FEELEY, supra note 180, at 272; see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff,
Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 115,
145 (1997) (noting that “criminal law is a specialty, and repeat players are frequent, despite
high turnover in prosecutorial offices”).
187
Battle, supra note 180, at 67.
188
Id.
189
HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 84–91.
190
See, e.g., Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady
Through the Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV. 138 (2012).
191
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE L.J. 1179, 1225–29 (1975); Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice
System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 83–85, 109
(2015).
192
WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON
PRACTICES 51 (1985) (finding that “prosecutors will make the discovery procedures more
cumbersome for certain defense attorneys whom they disliked or distrusted”); Alschuler,
supra note 191, at 1225 (“Recent studies indicate . . . that the benefit of informal discovery
results not from an attorney’s position as a public defender but simply from the attorney’s
personal relationship with individual prosecutors.”); see also BRUCE FREDERICK & DON
STEMEN, ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING—
TECHNICAL REPORT 102 (2012) (reporting prosecutor statements that a better relationship
with a defense attorney would result in a “better flow of information and a more just
resolution of a case”).
185
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The same cooperative dynamics also exist in negotiations about the
discovery of digital evidence. But what is notable about cases with massive
ESI is that the volume, cost, and complexity of digital discovery place
additional pressure on the parties to cooperate, simply as a way of
managing the discovery process itself (rather than as a means of obtaining
concessions in other areas). The following two sections review in greater
detail the incentives for prosecutors and defense attorneys to cooperate with
each other in e-discovery.
1. Prosecutorial Incentives
Prosecutors may grant a range of concessions to the defense in the
process of digital discovery. For example, they might provide broader
discovery than required under the rules.193 To assist the defense in
reviewing the data, prosecutors can also produce the documents in a
searchable format accessible to the defense and provide an index or a list of
“hot documents” to help the defense locate material evidence.194 In some
cases, prosecutors may help the defense obtain evidence from third parties
or provide the defense with official translations of relevant documents.195
Several factors might prompt the prosecution to grant such favors.
The principal incentive is the desire to resolve the case more quickly and at
a lesser cost.196 As Part III discussed, digital discovery is voluminous and
costly to sort, redact, produce, and review. It takes up a significant portion
of prosecutors’ time and slows down the resolution of cases.197
Cooperation can move the case at a faster pace and lower cost because it
educates the prosecution about the defense’s needs and preferences and
reduces the risk that the defense will file motions with the court to contest
the format, timing, or scope of discovery.198 Cooperation can also advance
the proceedings by helping the parties focus on the most important issues in
dispute. Finally, it can expedite the case because earlier discovery gives
both parties a better understanding of the case. Accordingly, if the
defendant sees overwhelming incriminating evidence against him, he may

193
See, e.g., FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 192, at 102; HEUMANN, supra note 180,
at 69–75; Battle, supra note 180, at 68–70.
194
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
195
See supra notes 143, 162–165, and accompanying text.
196
See Schneider, supra note 183, at 157 (“Problem-solving behavior could also result
from the clear need to settle cases and move work along.”).
197
See McConkie, supra note 51, at 70–71.
198
Cf. HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 69–75 (reporting results of study finding that
prosecutors are more generous with discovery toward defense attorneys who are less
adversarial and file fewer motions).
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enter a guilty plea more quickly; conversely, if the defense highlights
weaknesses in the prosecution’s case early on, the prosecution may agree to
dismiss some or all of the charges.
The prosecution may also help the defense with discovery to reduce
the risk that the court will intervene and render decisions that hurt the
prosecution. For instance, if the prosecution is not accommodating defense
requests to produce ESI in a particular format or in a certain time frame,
and as a result the defense is unable to review the discovery in time to
prepare for trial, the defense may ask the court to dismiss the case on
Speedy Trial grounds. Consider the example of United States v. Graham, a
tax fraud case involving approximately 1.5 million documents, 300
videotapes, 500 recorded conversations, 90 hard drives of computers, and
3,000 diskettes.199 The court dismissed the indictment without prejudice for
a Speedy Trial violation because the prosecution produced an
unmanageable amount of discovery on a rolling basis:
One, the volume of discovery in this case quite simply has been unmanageable for
defense counsel. Two, like a restless volcano, the government periodically spews
forth new discovery, which adds to defense counsels’ already monumental due
diligence responsibilities. Three, the discovery itself has often been tainted or
incomplete. For example, during oral argument, counsel for Defendants stated that
computer hard drives produced by the government were riddled with bugs and
viruses and that tape recordings and transcriptions were missing or incomplete.200

Dismissals for speedy trial violations under such circumstances are
rare—in large part because the parties can avoid the problem ahead of time
by asking that the court designate the case as complex.201 Some courts have
held expressly that voluminous discovery makes a case more complex and
cuts against a finding of a Speedy Trial violation.202
While a “complex case” designation may help reduce the risk of a
subsequent speedy trial violation, it does not entirely eliminate it. The
avoidance of this risk is an important motivator for the prosecution to
cooperate with the defense in managing massive ESI discovery. The ESI
Protocol recognizes this possibility and urges the parties to “determine how
199

United States v. Graham, 2008 WL 2098044, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 16, 2008).
Id.
201
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2012); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 8.2(a)(3); D. NEV. LOCAL R.
CRIM. P. 16-1. For an example of a court denying a speedy trial claim, despite delays due to
extensive discovery of ESI, see United States v. Bravata, 636 F. App’x 277, 289–90 (6th Cir.
2016); see also United States v. Qadri, 2010 WL 933752, at **4–6 (D. Haw. Mar. 9, 2010).
202
See, e.g., United States v. Baugh, 605 F. App’x 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The sheer
size and complexity of this sprawling gang case—featuring ten indictments, numerous
defendants, voluminous discovery, over 1,800 pretrial docket entries—accounts for most of
its length, which ‘favors a finding of no constitutional violation.’”).
200
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to ensure that any ‘meet and confer’ process does not run afoul of speedy
trial deadlines.”203
Another reason why prosecutors may cooperate with the defense is to
avoid claims of Brady violations. Prosecutors may provide open-file
discovery to preempt such claims (though as noted earlier, that may only
compound the difficulty of reviewing digital discovery in time to prepare
for trial).204 But in cases where prosecutors need to protect informants,
witnesses, or other confidential or privileged information, they may benefit
from cooperating with the defense to ensure that the evidence they are
withholding is not potentially exculpatory. Consultation with the defense
about how to handle sensitive information could help prosecutors avoid a
collapse of the case as a result of unintentional failure to disclose
impeachment or exculpatory evidence.205
Another common reason for prosecutors to help the defense with
digital discovery is to reduce the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims that may jeopardize a conviction and cause them to have to relitigate a case.206 As digital information becomes a standard element of
criminal cases, but defense attorneys frequently lack the technical
competence or resources to process it properly, claims of ineffective
assistance are likely to rise.207 When prosecutors see an attorney who is
overwhelmed by massive discovery and does not have the resources or
competence to assist the client adequately, they may ask investigative
agents to help the attorney with processing the evidence, or they may
produce indices or lists of hot documents to guide the defense with its
review.208
203

ESI Protocol, supra note 89, rec. 5.
Interview with Jason Hawkins, supra note 85.
205
United States v. Bundy is an example of a case with voluminous ESI, including audio
and video evidence, which prosecutors did not properly disclose because of concerns about
sensitive evidence. The failure to disclose Brady material led to a dismissal of the case. Such
failures are more likely to be avoided if the parties discuss e-discovery in good faith. See
Transcript, United States v. Bundy, Docket No. 2:16-CR-00046 (D. Nev. Jan. 8, 2018), at
https://www.scribd.com/document/369154834/Transcript-Jan-8-2018
[https://perma.cc/ZH34-JQUC]; United States v. Bundy, Government’s Brief Opposing
Dismissal with Prejudice, Docket No. 2:16-CR-00046 (D. Nev. Feb 17, 2016).
206
Shara Saget, See Something, Say Something?, 44 PROSECUTOR J. 3 (2014); Andrea L.
Westerfeld, Preventing Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 41 PROSECUTOR J. 4
(2011).
207
See Brandon L. Garrett, Big Data and Due Process, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE
207, 215 (2014).
208
See, e.g., United States v. Budovsky, No. 13 CR 00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133, at
*10, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016) (noting that the government “has promptly responded to
every defense request for assistance and sent law enforcement personnel to the defense to
204
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Some prosecutors may also cooperate on digital discovery with the
defense as a matter of professional integrity and courtesy, reflecting a
vision of the prosecutor’s role as a “minister of justice.”209 An office
culture that encourages a cooperative approach to disclosure can likewise
have an important influence on prosecutors’ choices.210 And as with
cooperation in criminal cases overall, prosecutors may cooperate to remain
on friendly terms with defense attorneys with whom they frequently
work.211 A friendly relationship ensures that defense attorneys do not
overwhelm prosecutors with motions and trials. It also makes the practice
of criminal law more pleasant for the attorneys involved.
But above all, prosecutors are likely to negotiate digital discovery
procedures with the defense in order to avoid more onerous orders from the
court.212 Some district judges, for example, in the Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York, frequently enter pretrial orders requiring
certification of substantial disclosure from the prosecution, an index of
materials produced, tentative exhibit lists, and copies of exhibits.213 In
districts where judges are expected to take a more active role in the case of
discovery disputes, the prosecution may prefer to settle any disputes
informally with the defense rather than invite judicial management of
digital discovery.214

assist it with technical issues” and that it has “explained in detail which items of discovery
supported the allegations in the Indictment”); United States v. Shafer, 2011 WL 977891, at
*5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2011) (observing that the government “conducted personal discovery
sessions with the defense attorneys to highlight specific evidence relevant to each defendant
and where to find it in the discovery”). Prosecutors have acknowledged providing broader
discovery and other assistance to the defense as a means of avoiding subsequent claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Westerfeld, supra note 206, at 4.
209
Cf. Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome,
56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1093–94 (1066) (finding that more experienced prosecutors tend to
be more understanding of defense attorneys’ function and are therefore more cooperative);
Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context, in LAWYERS IN
PRACTICE 269, 288–89 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (discussing how
prosecutors’ individual philosophies and personalities shape disclosure decisions).
210
See Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 209, at 279–84.
211
See, e.g., id. at 278 (discussing interview results finding that prosecutors “maintain
generous disclosure practices to build cooperative relationships with defense lawyers”).
212
Cf. id. at 278 (discussing interview findings that “[i]n jurisdictions in which the court
exercises some authority over the discovery process—either informally or pursuant to court
rules—prosecutors appear to be more diligent in complying with their obligations in gray
areas”).
213
NYCDL and NACDL Letter, supra note 104.
214
See, e.g., United States v. Shabudin, 2014 WL 1379717 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8,
2014) (faced with a hearing on a motion to compel discovery, the prosecution voluntarily
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2. Defense Incentives
Defense attorneys are motivated to cooperate with prosecutors
primarily to obtain favorable treatment of their clients, such as a dismissal
or reduction of the charges or a more lenient sentence.215 They may also be
accommodating in order to obtain some of the prosecutorial concessions
discussed in the previous section, such as access to broader and more
accessible discovery.216 Such concessions allow the defense to better
prepare for plea negotiations or trial and move the case along more quickly,
ultimately benefitting the client. If the client is detained, a swifter
resolution may also mean quicker release.217
Defense attorneys have publicly lamented the burdens of ESI review
and advocated for greater assistance from the prosecution in ESI-heavy
cases. They have emphasized how overwhelmed they are by the volume of
evidence in ESI cases. 218 As some shared with the Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules, “when you have hundreds of thousands of tapes and
gigabytes of data with no index, and you do not know what evidence the
government is going to use to prove its case, it is impossible for the
defendant to figure out the defense.”219 To comb through voluminous ESI,
therefore, defense attorneys may ask for “discovery indices and ‘hot
document’ lists,” notice about when discovery will be substantially
agreed to provide defense with access to ESI database and technical assistance with the
database).
215
See Schneider, supra note 183, at 158–59 (noting that sentencing reductions are a key
incentive for defense attorneys to be cooperative in hopes of obtaining a favorable plea
bargain for their client).
216
See, e.g., HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 69; see also Battle, supra note 180, at 68
(finding that some defense attorneys believe that a more cooperative approach gives them
broader access to the state’s evidence—in the words of one defense attorney, “If
[prosecutors] like you and you are cooperative, you can get access to their files for the
asking”).
217
Interview with Defense Attorney #1, October 10, 2017, Dallas, TX, 2017; see also
Schneider, supra note 183, at 160.
218
Interview with Defense Attorney #1, supra note 217 (“Many lawyers feel
overwhelmed by this. Some become obsessive about it.”). In cases with retained counsel,
“[c]lients often can’t pay for thorough review of the evidence disclosed.” Id. The financial
limitations in cases with appointed counsel are even greater. See, e.g., United States v.
Sierra, 2012 WL 2866417, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (discussing limited resources of
appointed counsel to review discovery); cf. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEF., AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE 19 (2004) (noting that as a result of poor funding and excessive caseloads,
“in many cases, indigent defense attorneys fail to fully conduct investigations [and] prepare
their cases . . . .”).
219
Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, Sept. 19, 2016, at 9, in Advisory Committee
on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2017, at 27.
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completed, production of trial exhibit lists, witness lists, and “early
disclosure of witness-related material.”220
To obtain cooperation from the prosecution, the defense may agree not
to file discovery motions (for broader discovery, earlier discovery, or
discovery in a different format) or other pretrial motions (for a bill of
particulars, for continuance of the case, or to dismiss the indictment on the
grounds of a Speedy Trial violation).221 More controversially, defense
attorneys might occasionally disclose more information about their client’s
case than they are legally required to share with the prosecution.222 In
general, the defense may make its demands less aggressively in an effort to
maintain a harmonious relationship with the prosecution and ultimately
help the client.223
In some cases, the defense might further agree to a waiver of any
evidence yet to be obtained by the prosecution. Such waivers have been
documented in Texas, where a recent law requires prosecutors to provide
open-file discovery.224 One Texas defense attorney speculated (without
condoning the practice) that the defense may agree to such waivers where a
client is detained and seeks to resolve the case more quickly, or where the
attorney is paid per case:
Police departments can be slow uploading body camera evidence (downloaded to a
police digital platform, but then queued to upload to D.A.’s platform). If the client
is anxious to plead to get probation, that may be a reason to agree to a discovery
waiver. Also, court-appointed defense attorneys get paid if a case is disposed—
that might be a reason to agree to a discovery waiver. 225

Decisions to forego filing a motion or to waive discovery rights
represent more problematic concessions than those concerning the format
of discovery. This is especially the case where discovery waivers are
220

Anello & Albert, supra note 102.
See HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 53–57, 61–69, 90; Alschuler, supra note 26, at 56;
Battle, supra note 180, at 73–74.
222
Battle, supra note 180, at 76–78.
223
Id. at 100–01.
224
TEXAS APPLESEED & TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT
JUSTICE: THE MICHAEL MORTON ACT’S FIRST YEAR 31–35 (2015). In Dallas, plea
agreements in felony cases since at least 2014 now include the following standard language:
“Understanding that I have these rights under Tex. Crim. P. 39.14 [the Michael Morton Act,
which provides for open-file discovery], I do knowingly waive (give up) my right to further
discovery, except as provided by law.” See Dallas County Plea Agreements on file with
author. Practitioners disagree on what the language of this waiver means, but the most
common interpretation is that it waives the defendant’s right to further discovery except for
the right to continue to receive exculpatory evidence, because the law specifically imposes a
continuing obligation on the prosecution to disclose Brady evidence.
225
Interview with Defense Attorney #1, supra note 217.
221
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offered as a take-it-or-leave it element of a plea bargain and are therefore
not entirely voluntary.226 They can materially compromise the rights of a
defendant in a criminal case. As the next section discusses, this possibility
highlights the limits and pitfalls of cooperation in discovery and in criminal
cases more generally.
C. THE LIMITS OF COOPERATION

Even when the defense and prosecution are faced with overwhelming
digital discovery, they may still abstain from cooperation in some cases. 227
For example, less experienced prosecutors and defense attorneys tend to be
more adversarial and less open to collaborating with the other side.228
Some defense attorneys may also cultivate a more combative image as a
way of attracting clientele.229 In certain cases, defense attorneys may also
find it in their client’s interest to use discovery motions as a delay tactic.230
As one member of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules commented,
“For every litigant operating in good faith . . . , there is another trying to
figure out reasons to delay a trial or put 400 associates on a case to generate
a gajillion gigabytes of data.”231
Even where the parties do work collaboratively on digital discovery,
such cooperation will not always produce a fair and just outcome. For
example, if the digital evidence at issue is too massive and complex, it may
simply be impossible for the parties (especially the defense) to review it
thoroughly in time for plea negotiations or trial.232 The inability to review
226

See Klein et al., supra note 191, at 83–85, 109.
CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 230 (noting that while some prosecutors
cooperate with defense attorneys in producing e-discovery, others do not, even within the
same district).
228
HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 53–57, 61–69; Battle, supra note 180; Wright &
Levine, supra note 209, at 1066–67.
229
See, e.g., Battle, supra note 180, at 75.
230
Delay may be advantageous to a defendant for various reasons, including the fading
of memories and unavailability of witnesses over time. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Courts
in Slow Motion, Aided by the Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013.
231
Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, April 28, 2017, at 8, in Advisory Committee
on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2017, at 26.
232
E.g., United States v. Budovsky, No. 13 CR 00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016). Defense attorneys who frequently handle ESI-heavy cases
acknowledge that attorneys need to relinquish the notion that they can read every document
in a case with voluminous digital evidence. Instead, attorneys must develop a strategy to
focus on the evidence most relevant to their case:
227

In the past, you wanted to touch every paper—it was a point of pride if you’d touched
and reviewed every paper. With the amount of data today, you can’t touch every page
any longer. The electronic storage curve is going up. I like to say, ‘Even if you only
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the evidence undermines the fairness and accuracy of the ultimate
disposition of the case. Furthermore, if one party has vastly superior
financial and investigative resources or disproportionate bargaining
leverage in the case—and therefore little need to compromise—it can
unduly influence the negotiations over digital discovery. As a result, the
other party may be left with insufficient ability to gather, process, or review
the digital evidence. It may also be pushed to agree to concessions—such
as broad waivers of discovery, including of potentially exculpatory
information—that risk compromising the fairness of the process.
Cooperation between the parties therefore has its limits. Defense
counsel must consider at each step whether collaboration with the
prosecution advances or compromises the client’s case. And both defense
and prosecution must remain vigilant that their cooperation does not lead to
unfair and unjust outcomes. Finally, a process that relies solely on
bargaining between the parties—and therefore on the willingness and
ability of individual prosecutors and defense attorneys to cooperate—is
haphazard and may lead to arbitrary differences among similarly situated
cases.233
VI. REGULATING DIGITAL DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES
Informal cooperation on digital discovery will not always occur in
criminal cases, and even when it does, it may not produce efficient and fair
resolution of discovery disputes. More extensive regulation of the process
is therefore necessary. The civil procedure model, which has grappled with
looked at each page for two seconds, the amount of pages there are, it will take you
75 years . . . Lawyers have to understand they can’t see everything. That means that
some relevant things are going to be excluded. Let’s say you exclude image files in a
fraud case—well, if the client had a fax software, you might exclude some relevant
faxes. So it’s important to talk to your client and know your case before you can make
these decisions. You’re making broad cuts before ever looking at anything. It’s
terrifying to a criminal defense attorney that you can miss something.
Interview with Marlo P. Cadeddu, supra note 82; see also Interview with Jason Hawkins,
supra note 85 (“Some defense attorneys think you have to look at every page, touch
everything. But you can’t do that with voluminous ESI. You have to have a theory of the
defense case.”).
233
Cf. CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 230 (citing Michael Caruso, Federal Public
Defender, S.D. Fla.) (“Here in this district . . . the process is quite haphazard. We may have a
case where you just get a document dump . . . We have other cases where prosecutors will
provide a skeletal index. We have other cases where the prosecutors will provide a full index
and will sit down and talk with you and walk you through everything that’s in the 1,000
PDFs . . . Unless there is a uniform standard, especially in the area of electronic discovery, I
don’t know if there’s much we can do except bargain on . . . a case by case basis for a better
outcome.”).
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digital discovery for over two decades, can provide a helpful point of
comparison for criminal procedure rule makers. This Part reviews the
promise and limits of the civil procedure model and lays out a framework to
regulate digital discovery in criminal cases.
A. LESSONS FROM CIVIL PROCEDURE

Starting in the late 1990s, as digital evidence began proliferating,
parties and courts in civil cases were confronted with the problems of
voluminous and complex electronic discovery. The problem arose in civil
cases earlier than in criminal cases because civil discovery requirements are
significantly broader and civil disputes frequently feature businesses that
store and process vast amounts of data. While these businesses can
typically afford to pay for a large team of lawyers to process, review, and
produce such evidence, the challenges remain daunting, as a 2007 article by
experienced litigators explained:
Take then, for example, litigation in which the universe subject to search stands
at one billion e-mail records, at least 25% of which have one or more attachments of
varying length (1 to 300 pages). Generously assume further that a model “reviewer”
(junior lawyer, legal assistant, or contract professional) is able to review an average of
fifty e-mails, including attachments, per hour. Without employing any automated
computer process to generate potentially responsive documents, the review effort for
this litigation would take 100 people, working ten hours a day, seven days a week,
fifty-two weeks a year, over fifty-four years to complete. And the cost of such a
review, at an assumed average billing of $100/hour, would be $2 billion. Even,
however, if present-day search methods . . . are used to initially reduce the e-mail
universe to 1% of its size . . . the case would still cost $20 million for a first pass
review conducted by 100 people over 28 weeks, without accounting for any
additional privilege review.234

To address the problem of voluminous discovery, the Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules has amended the Rules of Civil Procedure
several times, starting in 1983.235 In 2006, the Rules also expressly
addressed the distinct challenges of electronic discovery.236 The rules
promote cooperation between the parties to resolve e-discovery disputes
and provide for judicial guidance in cases where cooperation fails to
achieve fair and efficient discovery.

234

George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System
Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, *20 (2007).
235
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 1983 amendment.
236
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 2006 amendment.

2019]

MANAGING DIGITAL DISCOVERY

281

1. Promoting Cooperation Between the Parties
The Rules and decisions interpreting the Rules are based on the idea
that the digital information overload requires a “change in culture” among
litigators when it comes to discovery: “truculence, gamesmanship, and a
supreme rule of ‘volunteer nothing’” have to give way to cooperation.237
To promote such cooperation, Rule 26(f) requires attorneys to meet and
confer about discovery issues before the initial scheduling conference with
the court.238 The Rule demands that the parties work together in good faith
to develop a discovery plan to be submitted to the court within fourteen
days of the conference.239 The discovery plan must state the parties’ views
on “issues about disclosure, discovery or preservation of electronically
stored information, including the form or forms in which it should be
produced.”240 Court decisions have further held that the parties should
discuss difficult and potentially contentious e-discovery issues, such as
“whether each other’s software is compatible . . . and how to allocate costs
[of e-discovery].”241 Elaborating on the Federal Rules, many court
decisions and local rules have provided more specific guidelines, urging the
parties to reach agreement on items such as production format, “search
terms, date ranges, key players, and the like.”242
Yet not all civil lawyers believe in the value of cooperation in ediscovery. In fact, the traditional view about discovery is that it is “a game,
where players stall, obfuscate, and contest all discovery.”243 Accordingly,
many civil litigators continue to abuse discovery to harass their opponents
or delay the case.244 Surveys have found that civil litigators tend to be more
237

Paul & Baron, supra note 234, at *3.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Securities Litigation, 205 F.R.D. 437, 444 (D.N.J. 2002).
More generally, judges have cited with approval to the “Cooperation Proclamation” issued
by the Sedona Conference (a working group of attorneys, judges, and other experts on
complex litigation), which instructs attorneys to “strive in the best interests of their clients to
achieve the best results at a reasonable cost, with integrity and candor as officers of the
court.” SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 19, at 106.
242
Trusz v. UBS Realty Inv’rs LLC, 2010 WL 3583064, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 7, 2010).
243
Paul W. Grimm & Heather Leigh Williams, “The [Judicial] Beatings Will Continue
until Morale Improves”: The Prisoner’s Dilemma of Cooperative Discovery and Proposals
for Improved Morale, 43 U. BALT. L.F. 107, 116 (2013).
244
See, e.g., Paul W. Grimm, The State of Discovery Practice in Civil Cases: Must the
Rules Be Changed to Reduce Costs and Burden, or Can Significant Improvements Be
Achieved Within the Existing Rules?, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 47 (2011); Rebecca M. Hamburg
& Matthew C. Koski, Summary of Results of Federal Judicial Center Survey of NELA
Members, Fall 2009 (Nat’l Empl. Lawyers Assoc. Mar. 26, 2010), at
238
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adversarial and less likely to cooperate with one another than lawyers in
criminal cases, in large part because of the less frequent repeat player
interaction between lawyers in civil disputes.245 Discovery cooperation
may therefore fail when the attorneys have a poor relationship with each
other, or when they find it strategically useful to act in an adversarial
fashion.246 Non-cooperation is also more likely to occur when lawyers do
not understand the technological issues involved in e-discovery.247
2. Encouraging Judicial Management
Recognizing the persistence of adversarial tactics in discovery, the
Civil Rules also provide for active and early judicial management of
discovery, as well as judicial intervention when cooperation fails. At the
Rule 16 pretrial conference early in the litigation, and again later during the
discovery process, judges are expected to step in to manage schedules and
resolve disputes. The Advisory Committee notes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure stress “the need for continuing and close judicial
involvement in the cases that do not yield readily to the ideal of effective
party management.”248 This management may be provided by a district
court judge, but more often, it is delegated to a magistrate.249 Occasionally,

http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/nela_summary_of_results_of_fjc_survey_of_nela_members.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7A3Q-TVQJ] (finding that approximately two-thirds of respondents to
NELA survey believe that discovery is abused in almost every case); ABA SECTION OF
LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT 106 (2009), at
www.abanet.org/litigation/survey/docs/report-aba-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/29QS-696L]
(finding that most defense and mixed practice lawyers tend to agree that e-discovery is being
abused by counsel, while most plaintiffs’ lawyers do not).
245
Schneider, supra note 183, at 151, 156–57.
246
See, e.g., Mitchell London, Resolving the Civil Litigant’s Discovery Dilemma, 26
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 837, 838 (2013) (“The high costs [of e-discovery] have incentivized
lawyers to engage in abusive or excessive discovery practices as a strategy to either increase
settlement pressure or force their adversaries to abandon the dispute. Because abusive
methods have proliferated, litigants assume that their adversary is strategically abusing the
process—either by making unreasonable requests or by hiding information.”).
247
SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEC. DISCOVERY COMM., SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM REPORT ON PHASE ONE 20 (2010), available at
https://www.discoverypilot.com/sites/default/files/phase1report.pdf [https://perma.cc/64JNMG6B].
248
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 2015 amendment.
249
Hon. Paul W. Grimm, Are We Insane? The Quest for Proportionality in the
Discovery Rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 REV. LITIG. 117, 134–41 (2017)
(reporting findings of survey of federal judges); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2009) (authorizing
such delegation); FED. R. CIV. P. 72 (setting out procedures to be used by magistrates in
managing pretrial matters such as discovery).
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judges may also appoint special masters to help the parties coordinate
discovery more effectively.250 The goal of judicial management is to reduce
the costs of discovery and the length of the proceedings, while ensuring that
the case is resolved in a fair and just manner. 251
Judges rely on the principle of proportionality to limit discovery
perceived as redundant or overly burdensome. Proportionality was first
introduced by the Rules in 1983 to manage large-volume discovery and has
since been refined numerous times, both in the Rules and in case law.252
The most recent amendment of Rule 26(b)(1) uses proportionality to limit
the scope of discoverable evidence at the outset. Parties may obtain
discovery of evidence only if it is nonprivileged, relevant to a claim or
defense, and proportional to the needs of the case.253 In determining
proportionality, the court must consider “the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to
relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery
in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”254 Judges are supposed to restrict
discovery if the process is being abused or “overused” such that the
discovery requested is out of proportion with the needs of the case.255
With respect to ESI, the rules impose more specific limits. If a party
shows that the data sought are “not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost,” the court may issue a protective order that shields the
responding party from production.256 But if the requesting party shows
250
FED. R. CIV. P. 53; Grimm, supra note 249, at 154–56. Because the parties must bear
the costs of a special master appointment, a master will be appointed only if either the
parties consent or an exceptional circumstance warrants the appointment or it is necessary to
“address pretrial . . . matters that cannot be effectively and timely addressed by an available
district judge or magistrate judge of the district.” FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1).
251
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (noting that the Rules of Civil Procedure should be interpreted in
such a way as “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding”).
252
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to the 1983 and 2015 amendments;
Grimm, supra note 249, at 123–34.
253
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
254
Id.
255
Under Rule 26(b)(2)(C), the court is expected to curtail discovery if it determines
that: “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; the
party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in
the action;” or “the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).”
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). See Carr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 312 F.R.D. 459, 468
(N.D. Tex. 2015) (“[A] court can—and must—limit proposed discovery that it determines is
not proportional to the needs of the case.”).
256
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
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good cause, the court may still order discovery even though the ESI is
difficult or costly to produce.257 In deciding whether good cause exists,
courts consider, among else, the relevance and usefulness of the ESI to the
case, the availability of similar information from more easily accessed
sources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the
parties’ resources.258
Courts have adopted a range of other measures to reduce the cost and
complexity of voluminous digital discovery.259 Under a “phased discovery”
approach, judges have limited the discovery allowed at the outset of the
process and later reassessed the need for additional discovery based on the
initial production.260 Courts have also encouraged the parties to limit the
number of “custodians” or sources to be searched,261 or to stipulate to
certain facts in an effort to focus the litigation on matters that are in
dispute.262 Judges have also ordered the discovery of only a statistically
significant sample of the other party’s records, particularly in cases
involving massive databases.263
Another technique commonly used to reduce the costs of discovery is
to shift the costs of production from one party to the other. The
presumption in civil procedure is that the party responding to a discovery
request must bear the financial burden of complying with the request. 264
But where such compliance would entail an “undue burden or expense,” the
producing party may ask the court to shift the burden to the party seeking
discovery.265 Such cost-shifting may incentivize the requesting party to
257
Id. “Active” data are typically considered accessible, but backup tapes and erased,
fragmented, or damaged data are typically deemed inaccessible. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
258
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 2006 amendment; see also Cassie
M. v. Chafee, 2013 WL 11327084, at *5–*8 (D.R.I. Oct. 3, 2013); John B. v. Goetz, 879 F.
Supp. 2d 787, 884–89 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington
v. WMATA, 242 F.R.D. 139, 147–48 (D.D.C. 2007).
259
Grimm, supra note 249, at 141–76.
260
See, e.g., id. at 159–60.
261
See, e.g., United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 272 F.R.D. 235, 241
(D.D.C. 2011) (using proportionality analysis to limit the number of custodians whose data
would be searched); Lights Out Holdings, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 2015 WL 4612116, at *3 (S.D.
Cal. July 31, 2015) (ordering the parties to meet and confer to limit the number of
custodians).
262
See, e.g., Donald E. Christophers, Case Management Conferences and Pretrial
Hearings, and Pretrial Stipulations and Orders, BL FL-CLE 10-1 (2017).
263
Grimm, supra note 249, at 162–63.
264
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
265
Id. Cost-shifting may also be ordered as part of a proportionality approach, even
when production is not shown to be unduly burdensome.
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narrow its discovery requests and therefore lower the costs of ediscovery.266
To lessen the most significant costs of discovery—the costs of
review—some courts have encouraged the use of technology such as
predictive coding.267 Predictive coding uses artificial intelligence to find
relevant documents more accurately than keyword searching.268 The
process begins by human review of a sample set of documents.269 The
computer then reviews the initial sample set of documents, identifies
common features, and looks for similar documents in the remaining set. 270
At that point, an attorney reviews the results of the computerized search and
adjusts the search criteria as needed.271 Testing and improving results at
each step of the process, predictive coding can produce an accuracy level
similar to that of manual review of voluminous evidence, but at a lesser cost
and faster speed.272
Another way in which courts have tried to reduce the costs of ediscovery is to shorten the timeline within which discovery occurs. Where
the parties have failed to agree on deadlines, judges have set timetables
themselves. They have also imposed sanctions when the parties have failed
to comply with their discovery obligations.273
While judges frequently focus on restricting the scope of discovery to
manageable proportions, at times, they temper efforts to narrow the scope
of discovery in order to ensure that the process is fair. For example, the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has clarified that, in conducting
proportionality analyses, courts should consider “the parties’ relative access
to relevant information.”274 This factor was included to address cases with
“information asymmetry,” where “one party—often the individual

266

E.g., Hon. James C. Francis IV, Cost Shifting in E-Discovery, in MANAGING EDISCOVERY AND ESI: FROM PRE-LITIGATION THROUGH TRIAL 591, 613–14 (Michael D.
Berman et al. eds. 2011).
267
Grimm, supra note 249, at 167–69.
268
Edward J. Imwinkelried & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Tactics for Attorney Seeking
Production, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY STRATEGY & TACTICS § 9:13 (2017).
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id. But cf. David J. Waxse & Brenda Yoakum-Kriz, Experts on Computer-Assisted
Review: Why Federal Rule of Evidence 702 Should Apply to Their Use, 52 WASHBURN L.J.
207 (2013) (noting that the use of experts to offer opinions on predictive coding may
decrease the efficiency of the technology).
273
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37; Patroski v. Ridge, 2011 WL 5593738, at *4 (W.D. Pa.
Nov. 17, 2011).
274
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 2015 amendment.
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plaintiff—may have very little discoverable information. . . [while] [t]he
other party may have vast amounts of information, including information
that can be readily retrieved. . . .”275 When this occurs, “the burden of
responding to discovery lies heavier on the party who has more
information. . .”276
In the interests of fairness, when deciding whether to restrict ediscovery or shift its costs, courts may also consider factors such as each
party’s ability to control costs, the importance of the issues at stake, and the
parties’ resources.277 If a case involves an important public matter—such as
a constitutional, civil rights, or criminal law question—courts are more
likely to order discovery, even if producing such discovery is unduly
burdensome.278
Likewise, if the party requesting discovery has
significantly fewer resources than the party producing discovery, the court
is less likely to shift costs for the production.279 As the next section
discusses, courts have also used the format and organization requirements
of Rule 34 to prevent a better-resourced party from overwhelming the other
side with voluminous and disorganized production of ESI. In all these
ways, courts help ensure that e-discovery proceeds not simply efficiently,
but also fairly.
3. Drafting Detailed Rules
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set out clearly what the parties’
presumptive obligations are with respect to the formatting and organization
of ESI production. Rule 34(b)(1)(C) provides that the party requesting ESI
“may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information
is to be produced.”280 If the responding party objects to the requested form
of ESI, it must state the form it would use instead.281 If the parties cannot
275

Id.
Id.
277
John B. v. Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787, 887 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)
advisory committee’s note to the 2006 amendment (listing factors to be considered in
restricting discovery and shifting costs). In determining the parties’ resources, some courts
focus solely on the parties’ finances, while others also consider counsel’s resources. Francis
IV, supra note 266, at 610–11.
278
See, e.g., Simon v. Nw. Univ., 2017 WL 467677, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2017);
Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
279
See, e.g., Hawa v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., 2017 WL 1021026, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 16, 2017) (refusing to shift costs from school district to individual plaintiffs, given the
disparity of resources between the parties).
280
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C).
281
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D).
276
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come to an agreement about the form and format of electronic discovery,
the court will decide. The court will be guided by the default
requirements282 laid out in Rule 34(b)(2)(E):
(i) A party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or
must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request;283
(ii) If a request does not specify a form for producing electronically stored
information, a party must produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily
maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms; and
(iii) A party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than
one form.284

These requirements prevent discovery “dumps” of “an unidentified
mass” of documents, as well as the deliberate mixing of relevant and
irrelevant ESI to make it difficult for the receiving party to review.285
Similar provisions in state rules of civil procedure guide the production,
formatting, and labeling of ESI to ensure fair and efficient discovery.286
Judges have relied on these requirements and on their own inherent
authority to manage discovery to order parties to organize and label
documents and ESI produced in discovery.287 To facilitate review by the
The Rule states that these requirements apply “unless otherwise stipulated or ordered
by the court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E).
283
As a Michigan federal court explained:
Rule 34(b)(i) is meant to prevent a party from obscuring the significance of
documents by giving some structure to the production. The party arguing that it
produced documents as they were kept in the usual course of business bears the
burden of showing that the documents were so kept. A party does so by revealing
such information as where the documents were maintained, who maintained them,
and whether the documents came from one single source or file or from multiple
sources or files.
Nolan, LLC. v. TDC Int’l Corp., 2007 WL 3408584, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 15, 2007)
(citations omitted). If the producing party fails to explain how the documents were kept in
the ordinary course of business, then it must organize the production to correspond to the
request for production. See, e.g., Enargy Power (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd. v. Xiaolong Wang,
2014 WL 4687542, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2014).
284
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E). Although 34(b)(2)(E)(i) refers to “documents” while (ii)
expressly refers to ESI, most courts have held that both (i) and (ii) apply to ESI because the
drafters intended to reduce the hurdles of ESI review faced by the receiving party. Steven S.
Gensler, Rule 34, 1 FED. R. CIV. PROC., RULES AND COMMENTARY (2018).
285
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes to 1980 and 2006
amendments; United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 19–20 (D.D.C. 2008); see also
Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., LLC, 323 F.R.D. 360, 386–89 (D.N.M. 2018).
286
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122(c); N.J. CT. R. 4:18-1; FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.350.
287
See, e.g., Enargy Power, 2014 WL 4687542, at *4 (holding that where the producing
party did not show that the documents were produced as they were kept in the usual course
of business, they must organize and label the documents to correspond to the categories in
282
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requesting party, they have also required the parties to produce ESI in a
format that is “reasonably usable,” even if this requires converting the files
in a different format.288 When the ESI is particularly complex—for
example, when producing database information—courts have even ordered
the producing party “to provide some reasonable amount of technical
support, information on application software, or other reasonable assistance
to enable the requesting party to use the information.”289
In brief, the law regulates digital discovery more closely in civil than
in criminal cases. Some of the rules and managerial techniques of civil
procedure could also be applied in criminal cases, and indeed, a few judges
have done precisely that.290 But as the next section elaborates, a number of
important differences between civil and criminal cases limit the analogical
value of the civil model for digital discovery. These differences explain
why wholesale adoption of the civil procedure rules for digital discovery
would not work and why more tailored regulation for criminal case ediscovery is needed.
B. THE LIMITS OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE MODEL

A number of differences between the civil and criminal procedure
frameworks caution against wholesale adoption of the civil model. These
include different pleading standards, varying background discovery rules,
and disparity in the resources available to the parties. More broadly,
criminal procedure rules incorporate important constitutional rights, which
request for production); Hanwha Azdel, Inc. v. C & D Zodiac, Inc., 2012 WL 6726412, at *2
(W.D. Va. Dec. 27, 2012) (holding that defendant “violated Rule 34 by not producing its ESI
in a format which is usable or providing an index and ordering the documents responsive to
the specific requests for production”); EEOC v. DHL Exp., 2011 WL 6825516, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 28, 2011) (ordering the defendant to supplement discovery with a “particularized
list of the discovery request(s) to which each spreadsheet, or groups of spreadsheets, if
appropriate, is responsive”); City of Colton v. Am. Promotional Events Inc., 277 F.R.D. 578
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (ordering the production of ESI in native format or the labeling of ESI
production to correspond to requests for production); see also Suarez Corp. Industries v.
Earthwise Technologies, Inc., 2008 WL 2811162, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 17, 2008)
(ordering the defendant to “convey some information as to how documents [produced] were
determined to be responsive or how the documents were kept in the normal course of
business”).
288
See, e.g., In re Verisign, Inc., Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 2445243, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
10, 2004).
289
Pero v. Norfolk Southern Ry., Co., 2014 WL 6772619, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 1,
2014) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to the 2006 amendment); see also
Frye v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2016 WL 2758268, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 12, 2016); Gensler,
supra note 284, at 15.
290
See, e.g., United States v. Briggs, 831 F. Supp. 2d 623, 628 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); United
States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008).
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restrain the ability of the state to gather information directly from
defendants.291 Other critical constitutional rights that shape criminal
procedure include the rights to due process (which is more robust in the
criminal than the civil context), to speedy trial, and to effective counsel.292
These may warrant more active judicial intervention in certain discovery
disputes—for example, to ensure that a criminal defendant has a reasonable
opportunity to prepare for trial. Finally, the public interest in ensuring fair,
accurate, and transparent criminal prosecutions also has implications for
criminal case discovery rules, weighing against certain restrictions and
waivers of discovery that are more easily accepted in civil cases. While
many other differences between the civil and criminal procedure
frameworks exist, the brief overview in this section focuses on those
differences that are especially pertinent to digital discovery rules and
practices.
As a preliminary matter, the background pleading and discovery rules
differ significantly in civil and criminal cases.293 Parties in a civil case can
discover a broader range of information than their counterparts in a criminal
case. In a civil case, discovery is available on any matter that is not
privileged, is relevant to claims and defenses, and is proportional to the
case.294 The broad availability of discovery in civil cases raises the cost and
complexity of digital evidence that the parties must handle. By contrast,
criminal procedure rules limit in various ways the type of evidence that
must be produced by either party, reducing the volume of digital
discovery.295
At the same time, civil procedure rules better equip the parties to cope
with voluminous digital discovery. Pleading requirements are more
demanding in civil cases and thus help the parties better understand the
issues in dispute. The complaint must include “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief . . . .”296 To
sustain a motion to dismiss, the complaint must include “enough facts to

291

U.S. Const. amend. V, VI, XIV.
U.S. Const. amend. V, VI, XIV.
293
For a fascinating analysis of the different trajectories of the federal civil and criminal
procedure rules, see Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A
Forgotten History, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 697 (2017).
294
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
295
Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 825–26 (1996) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(1)). The main reason for these limitations is the concern about protecting victims,
witnesses, and informants. See, e.g., Meyn, supra note 21, at 1127–28.
296
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
292
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state a claim that is plausible on its face.”297 In other words, “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”298 While the exact level of detail required is ultimately left to the
trial judge’s discretion, the Supreme Court has specified that “‘labels and
conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.’”299 As a result of this jurisprudence, civil defendants have
better notice than criminal defendants about the key facts supporting the
allegations against them, and the pleadings can help civil parties direct their
digital discovery efforts.300
By contrast, defendants in criminal cases typically receive only a
skeletal description of the relevant facts in the indictment or information.301
Rules of criminal procedure require merely that the charging instrument
contain a “plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential
facts constituting the offense charged . . . .”302 Prosecutors need not state
the facts in specific detail. An indictment will survive a motion to dismiss
as long as it informs the defendant of the statute he is charged with
violating, lists the elements of the offense charged, and specifies the time
and place of the alleged offense.303 In theory, a defendant may file a motion

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
298
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
299
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
300
Roughly half of the states have rules that replicate the federal rules on this point,
while the rest have procedures that differ significantly. Roger Michalski & Abby K. Wood,
Twombly and Iqbal at the State Level, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 424, 430 (2017). In the
wake of Twombly and Iqbal, twenty-four states have moved towards “tighter pleading”
while twenty-six states have maintained “notice pleading.” A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading
in State Courts After Twombly and Iqbal, POUND CIV. JUST. INST. 2 (2010), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038349
[https://perma.cc/Y42K5P7T].
301
Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, Sept. 19, 2016, at 9, in Advisory Committee
on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2017, at 27.
302
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.140(b) (providing that an
indictment or information shall be a “plain, concise, and definite written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/111-3
(stating that the charge must include the name of the offense, the statutory provision, the
nature and elements of the offense, the date and county of the offense, and the name of the
accused); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 21.02 (providing that an indictment must contain the name
of the accused, the place where the offense was committed, and the offense set forth in
“plain and intelligible words.”).
303
United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 772 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Ulbricht,
31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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for a bill of particulars if the indictment is not sufficiently specific.304 But
such motions are rarely granted, particularly if the defendant is entitled to
discovery.305 In fact, motions for bills of particulars are often seen by
prosecutors and courts as aggressive tactics by the defense and might invite
retaliation.306
In addition to requiring greater specificity in pleadings, civil rules
provide for active discovery tools such as depositions and interrogatories.
These tools again help the parties better understand the heart of the case and
review ESI accordingly.307 They can help not only with understanding the
substance of the evidence produced, but also with the organization of the
discovery. For example, in civil cases with voluminous digital discovery,
the parties receiving the ESI have used interrogatories and depositions to
determine the procedures that the producing party used to collect, search,
and produce the information.308
But in criminal cases, neither depositions nor interrogatories are
generally available.309 The prosecution has a powerful substitute for a
deposition: subpoenaing witnesses to testify before a grand jury. But the
defense has no such powers and has to rely on the voluntary cooperation of
potential witnesses, which is rarely forthcoming. As a result, the defense is
at a significant disadvantage in obtaining relevant testimonial evidence—in
comparison to both the prosecution and civil litigants.310 This undercuts its
ability to understand the crux of the case and focus its discovery efforts
accordingly.

304

FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f).
See, e.g., Urban, 404 F.3d at 772; United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1180 (9th
Cir. 1979); Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1148 (2005) (same); Hon. H. Lee Sarokin,
Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This
Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1991) (noting that motions for bills of
particulars are rarely granted).
306
HEUMANN, supra note 180, at 52–91 (finding that prosecutors and courts view
motions for bills of particulars as aggressive tactics and that such motions are usually filed
by inexperienced defense attorneys).
307
See, e.g., Edward L. Miner & Adrian P. Schoone, The Effective Use of Written
Interrogatories, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 29, 29 (1976); see also Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules
Meeting, Sept. 19, 2016, at 9, in Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting,
Washington, D.C., Apr. 28, 2017, at 27.
308
See, e.g., Jeffrey Gross, Objection to Form: Rule 34(B) and the Form of Production
of Electronically Stored Information, 20 PRAC. LITIGATOR 39, 43 (2009).
309
See, e.g., Meyn, supra note 21, at 1110, 1114 (surveying the availability of
depositions and interrogatories in criminal cases in different jurisdictions).
310
See, e.g., id. at 1091–97.
305
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In one respect, the prosecution is also more limited in its ability to
obtain testimonial evidence than a civil party might be. The privilege
against self-incrimination limits the ability of the prosecution to obtain
statements directly from the defendant.311 But exceptions to the privilege
against self-incrimination and the willingness of most defendants to waive
their right to remain silent mean that, in practice, the prosecution is
frequently able to obtain at least some critical information from the
defendant as well.312 And as discussed earlier, the privilege against selfincrimination has been interpreted to permit provisions demanding a broad
range of documentary evidence from the defense, including documents and
tangible objects the defense intends to use in its case, summaries of
anticipated expert testimony, and witness names and statements.313
The legal framework for obtaining documentary evidence from third
parties is likewise more favorable to civil litigants than to criminal
defendants. In civil cases, subpoenas for documents have to merely meet a
forgiving relevance standard.314 Relevance in this context has been
interpreted “broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that
reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on any issue that is or
may be in the case.”315 Subpoenas requesting relevant evidence will be
quashed or modified only if they require disclosure of privileged
information, impose an undue burden or cost on the person or entity that is
subject to the subpoena, or fail to meet geographical or timing
requirements.316
By contrast, in criminal cases, the Nixon standard requires that
subpoenas to non-parties meet the more stringent requirements of
relevancy, admissibility, and specificity.317 Parties in criminal cases are
therefore more constrained than their civil counterparts in obtaining
documentary evidence from non-parties. The limits on subpoena powers
311
Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 1567, 1572 (1986) (noting constitutional limitations on discovery against
the defense).
312
William W. Berry III, Magnifying Miranda, 50 TEX. TECH L. REV. 97, 103 (2017).
313
See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
314
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) & 45; Warnke v. CVS Corp., 265 F.R.D. 64, 66 (E.D.N.Y.
2010). The Civil Rules also require that the subpoena not be unduly burdensome. FED. R.
CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv).
315
AP Links, LLC v. Russ, 299 F.R.D. 7, 11 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)); see also Zabin v. Picciotto, 896 N.E.2d
937, 956 (Mass. 2008). Furthermore, “information within [the] scope of discovery need not
be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
316
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3).
317
See supra notes 127–131 and accompanying text.
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affect criminal defendants disproportionately. While the prosecution can
use searches and seizures to obtain documents and other tangible evidence
from anyone who has evidence relevant to the case, the defense’s only
option for gathering tangible evidence from non-cooperative third parties is
to rely on subpoenas. As a result, if the prosecution has failed to obtain
data, metadata, or algorithms relevant to the defense case, the defense
remains at a significant disadvantage in developing its case—an obstacle
that civil parties do not face under civil subpoena and discovery rules.
Another reason why the civil procedure approach to e-discovery
cannot be directly transplanted is the lack of resources in criminal cases
generally, but especially on the defense side. In complex civil litigation,
where e-discovery is likely to be the most challenging, the parties can
typically afford to pay for sophisticated software and technology experts, as
well as experienced lawyers and legal assistants to help with the process.
By contrast, in criminal cases, both prosecutors and defense attorneys have
limited funding for technological support and legal staff to process and
review digital discovery.318
Financial and staffing constraints are particularly acute for the defense.
Resource disparities between the parties are a distinguishing feature of
criminal cases in the United States.319 Over 80% of felony defendants have
appointed counsel, and appointed counsel—as well as many of retained
counsel who are solo practitioners—have fewer investigative resources and
staff than do prosecutors.320 Most pertinent to digital discovery, they can
rarely afford the software and personnel to process voluminous digital

318
See Brown, supra note 53, at 168 (describing difficulties experienced by local
prosecutor offices in Texas that lack the capacity to manage electronic evidence); Doucette,
supra note 4, at 431 (noting that few Virginia local prosecutor’s offices have the capacity for
e-discovery and that the introduction of such systems is “cost prohibitive” for many); see
also Claud, supra note 80, at 145.
319
See, e.g., Broderick, supra note 73. See generally Abraham Goldstein, The State and
the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 1149, 1149–50
(1960) (discussing the balance of legal advantages in favor of the prosecution); David
Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1731–49 (1993) (noting
the resource differential between defense and prosecution).
320
Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of Guilt: Systemic Factors That Contribute to
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CALIF. W. L. REV. 263, 268 (2009) (“For
every dollar spent statewide on prosecution [in California], only fifty-three cents is spent on
average for the defense of the indigent accused.”); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense
of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2014) (quoting DEBORAH L.
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 123 (2004)) (acknowledging that indigent defense receives “only
an eighth of the resources per case available to prosecutors”). On the crisis of indigent
defense in the United States, see STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEF., supra
note 218, at v, 7–14.
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evidence.321 To purchase the necessary software and hire an information
technology expert, appointed counsel has to get permission from the court.
Judges have discretion on what funding to authorize and on what
schedule.322 Defense attorneys may therefore not have sufficient funding to
review ESI adequately within the pretrial time constraints.323
Furthermore, while clients in civil cases are broadly available to
review the discovery and help the attorney make sense of it, criminal
defendants are often detained before trial and unable to assist counsel in
preparing for trial.324 Detention exacerbates the asymmetry of resources in
criminal cases and presents challenges that do not arise in civil cases.
Criminal cases also entail constitutional protections that civil cases do
not. The earlier discussion referenced the limits that the privilege against
self-incrimination sets on the ability of prosecutors to obtain testimonial

321

See, e.g., Broderick & Aoki, supra note 14, at 7; CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at
228 (“Panel attorneys have an especially difficult time handling ESI. Many are solo
practitioners with little or no staff, and they do not have the training, experience, or
assistance needed to access and review ESI.”).
322
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (2012); United States v. Salyer, 2011 WL
1466887, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2011); Draft Minutes, Criminal Rules Meeting, Sept. 19,
2016, at 9, in Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28,
2017, at 27 (“In 85-90% of cases defenders in federal cases represent poor people, and in
those cases they must go to the judge if they want an expert. That complicates the situation
enormously because the judges rightfully have discretion as to how much to spend, who you
can hire, at what point you can hire them.”); 7 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 310.70.30-40,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/judiciary-policies/cja-guidelines/chapter-3-ss-320authorization-investigative-expert#a320_70_30 [https://perma.cc/XZ9U-MCEK].
323
Cf. United States v. Budovsky, No. 13 CR 00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016) (“Given the fact that the discovery contains so many pages and
lines of data, no attorney or team of attorneys could meaningfully review all of it even with
years to prepare for trial.”); United States v. Faulkner, 2011 WL 3962513 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
8, 2011) (rejecting defense motion of continuance and noting that funding for computer
forensic expert in case involving 38 GB of ESI was approved eight months before trial date,
that full, searchable access to the processed data was approved five months before trial, and
that “decent access” to the ESI was provided to detained defendant 2 months before trial); cf.
STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEF., supra note 218, at 19 (noting that as a
result of poor funding and excessive caseloads, “in many cases, indigent defense attorneys
fail to fully conduct investigations [and] prepare their cases ”).
324
In federal court, between 2008 and 2010, only 36% of defendantswere released
before the adjudication of their case. THOMAS H. COHEN, PRETRIAL RELEASE AND
MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 2008–2010 (BJS 2012), at
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ pdf/prmfdc0810.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG3F-G8RE]. In
state court, 62% of felony defendants were released prior to disposition of their case.
THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN
STATE COURTS (BJS 2007), at https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8DUW-GKUG].
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evidence directly from the defendant.325 In addition, the stronger due
process protections in criminal cases, where the defendant’s liberty is at
stake, will at times mandate judicial intervention to ensure that discovery
proceeds fairly and that the defendant receives effective counsel, even if he
cannot afford one on his own. As discussion in the next section elaborates,
given the more significant due process protections in criminal cases, the
court may need to help defendants obtain digital evidence material to their
case from private parties; facilitate review of digital evidence by defendants
who are detained; and demand some prosecutorial organization of
voluminous digital evidence produced to the defense, to ensure that
exculpatory evidence is not overlooked.326
Besides stronger due process protections, criminal cases entail
important public values that are less likely to be at stake in private disputes.
Because of the public concerns involved, it is rarely appropriate to restrict
discovery on efficiency grounds under a proportionality analysis.327 Facts
necessary to the accurate resolution of a criminal or constitutional matter
are important not solely to the parties, but also to the public, and therefore
cannot remain concealed.328 By contrast, in purely private disputes, courts
325

See supra notes 311–313 and accompanying text.
See infra Part VI.C.2.
327
In civil cases, courts consider the importance of the issues at stake as one factor in
the proportionality analysis. Accordingly, while discovery is less likely to be limited in those
cases, the importance of the issues at stake is just one of several relevant factors, not a
dispositive one, and courts in civil cases concerning public matters (such as civil rights
claims) have occasionally restricted discovery when other factors have weighed in favor of a
restriction. See supra notes 252–255, 277 and accompanying text.
328
In analyzing whether to restrict discovery under the proportionality principle, a recent
court decision emphasized the important public issues at stake in criminal cases and related
civil actions:
326

The Court finds the importance of the issues at stake in this action extremely high.
The complaint on its face involves, among other things, two innocent civilians who
were murdered, two people who lost their liberty for extended periods of time both of
whom later had their convictions vacated, and a high profile journalism professor
accused of employing unethical investigatory tactics at the behest of one of the
nation’s most prestigious universities. The loss of liberty alone, as alleged, is
extremely significant . . . But the importance of this case transcends the parties
involved: at its core, it questions the legitimacy of the criminal justice system as
applied by the Cook County State’s Attorney’s office and the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system as questioned by Northwestern and Professor Protess, all
conducted squarely in the public eye. For these reasons, the Court finds this case to be
of utmost importance.
Simon v. Nw. Univ., 2017 WL 467677, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2017); see also John B. v.
Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787, 887 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (noting that the importance of the issues
at stake, enforcing congressional mandate to provide medically necessary care to children, is
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are more open to constraining disproportionate discovery requests and
better justified in doing so.
For all these reasons, legal as well as practical, the experiences with ediscovery in civil cases cannot be directly transplanted to the criminal
context. Instead, a more cautious comparative analysis is required.
C. REGULATION OF DIGITAL DISCOVERY TAILORED FOR CRIMINAL
CASES

While we must remain mindful of the differences between the civil
and criminal procedure frameworks, important similarities remain that can
help guide regulation of digital discovery in criminal cases. As David
Sklansky and Stephen Yeazell have argued, “civil and criminal
procedure . . . are both . . . systems of adjudicating—or otherwise
resolving—disputes, and settling—or sidestepping—disagreements about
historical facts. They both aim at fairness, accuracy, and efficiency—albeit
in different mixtures.”329 Of particular relevance to digital discovery, civil
litigants, courts, and rule makers have had to cope with the rising costs of ediscovery for more than two decades now and have developed some
workable measures to limit these costs. These include encouraging
cooperation between the parties, promoting active judicial management
where cooperation fails, and drafting detailed rules to govern e-discovery.
Civil procedure has also had to confront informational asymmetries
between the parties, an experience that can offer some guidance on
addressing one of the key problems in criminal digital discovery—the
disparity of resources and investigative power in criminal cases. Judges
and policymakers can therefore borrow from the civil procedure model for
regulating digital discovery and transplant features of it in the criminal
procedure setting, but in a way that is mindful of the differences in
background rules, resource constraints, due process protections, and public
interests at stake.
1. Promoting Cooperation Between the Parties
The first broadly accepted insight from the two decades of experience
with e-discovery in civil cases is that cooperation between the parties is
critical to reducing the cost of the process.330 While such cooperation is in
critical factor weighing in favor of ordering production of ESI, even if production is unduly
burdensome).
329
Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 21, at 684.
330
See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE:
DETAILED REPORT 3 (2009), at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/survey/ docs/ report-abareport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U7F-ZDFD] (reporting that 95% of the litigators surveyed
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tension with the adversarial model, it is not entirely incompatible with it.
As Judge Paul Grimm has observed, “[h]owever central the adversary
system is to our way of formal dispute resolution, there is nothing inherent
in it that precludes cooperation between the parties and their attorneys
during the litigation process to achieve orderly and cost effective discovery
of the competing facts on which the system depends.”331
In criminal cases, too, early experiences with e-discovery confirm the
insight that cooperation can help resolve some of the recurring disputes
about voluminous digital evidence. As Part V discussed, early experience
with digital discovery tends to confirm the benefits of cooperation, and
studies of criminal law practice more broadly have documented a
longstanding practice of reciprocal accommodation between the parties in
criminal cases.332 Along the same lines, early consultations between the
parties on digital discovery mechanics and openness to cooperation can go
a long way toward solving some frequent problems, such as distributing
fairly the burdens of formatting and reviewing digital files, finding
adequate methods for safeguarding sensitive information, and ensuring
discovery access by detained defendants.
Drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are therefore
correct to emphasize the importance of collaborative practice and require
the parties to meet and confer about digital discovery early in a criminal
proceeding, as the proposed Rule 16.1 does.333 In the notes accompanying
the proposed rule, the drafters also encourage the parties to refer to the ESI
Protocol, which can further usefully guide cooperation.334 Cooperation
about digital discovery mechanics, such as the format of discovery, the
location of key documents, and security and redaction measures to be taken,
can reduce the time, effort, and expenses needed to review digital evidence.
To promote such cooperation, rule drafters could presumptively place the

believe that collaboration and professionalism by attorneys can reduce client costs); see also
SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEC. DISCOVERY COMM., SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
PILOT PROGRAM REPORT ON PHASE ONE 39, at https:// www.discoverypilot.com/sites/
default/files/phase1report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZX2-EV5E] (survey finding that Principles
encouraging cooperation in discovery appear to be generally effective at improving
discovery practices and promoting the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of cases).
331
Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 361 (D. Md. 2008).
332
See supra Parts V.A–B.
333
Draft Rule 16.1, supra note 22.
334
Id. Courts should likewise encourage the parties to confer with one another and to
work out solutions to e-discovery problems. In the Western District of Oklahoma, local rules
require such a conference; within a week after the conference, the parties have to file a Joint
Statement of Discovery Conference, in which, among other things, they state contested
issues of discovery. W.D. OKLA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(b) App. V.
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burden of reformatting or cataloging digital evidence on the party with
greater resources in most criminal cases—the prosecution. Such a
presumption would encourage the prosecution to cooperate with the defense
in finding ways to reduce its own production burden. The prosecution may
argue in individual cases that it does not have greater resources than the
defense to process digital evidence and that the presumption should
therefore not apply.
Organizational innovations could also help spur cooperation in digital
discovery. Prosecutors’ offices, public defenders’ offices, and courts can
all create units of specialized attorneys and tech experts who can handle
ESI. The ESI experts within the public defenders offices could be made
available to private defense attorneys as well, at cost. A model for a similar
arrangement comes from the Dallas Federal Public Defender’s Office,
which has already made ESI storage and maintenance services available to
private defense attorneys appointed by the court in some cases.335 Lawyers
who are proficient in ESI can serve as “points of contact” at public
defenders offices and U.S. attorneys offices and help negotiate digital
discovery disputes that arise in cases handled by these offices. A similar
framework was proposed by the Joint Electronic Technology Working
Group to encourage collaboration in making e-discovery available to
detained defendants.336 If implemented more broadly to handle all ESIrelated problems that arise in criminal cases, it can improve the fairness and
efficiency of digital discovery.337
But while efforts to promote cooperation are important starting points,
they are not sufficient. Negotiations will falter in certain cases, either
because the cost and complexity of digital discovery are too high or because
one or both of the parties do not have a sufficient incentive to cooperate. In
yet other cases, the disparity of resources between the parties may be so
high that cooperation could produce inequitable results. For all those
reasons, courts and legislators must establish baseline rules for digital
discovery in criminal cases. As civil practice suggests, active judicial
management and detailed digital discovery rules are critical backstops when
cooperation falls apart.

335

See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
McEnany & Elm, supra note 145, at 49.
337
Surveys of civil litigators have found that lack of technical understanding is a key
reason for the failure of cooperation in e-discovery. See supra note 247 and accompanying
text. The creation of specialized units in the criminal justice system would therefore be
critical to the success of e-discovery cooperation in criminal cases.
336
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2. Encouraging Judicial Management
A key insight that applies in both the civil and criminal contexts is that
judges can promote a more efficient and fairer discovery process by
actively managing the process from an early stage. To increase the speed
and lower the cost of digital discovery, judges can require the parties to
develop a discovery plan shortly after the meet and confer session, impose
deadlines for discovery, order a “phased discovery,” and, where necessary,
resolve disputes about abusive discovery.338
In civil cases, such
management techniques have been effective in reducing the costs of
discovery.339
While many of these techniques can streamline the process without
impairing the defendant’s rights or the public’s interest in transparency and
truth-seeking, others—such as monetary caps—are likely to be problematic
if applied to the criminal context. Criminal cases aim to vindicate an
important public interest in accurate factfinding about alleged breaches of
fundamental community norms. Because criminal cases may result in
deprivation of liberty by the state, they also implicate fundamental
constitutional rights of the accused. Courts must therefore be careful not to
curb discovery in a way that may jeopardize the public’s interest in accurate
factfinding or the defendant’s due process rights, including the right to
receive exculpatory evidence from the prosecution. Just as judges have
been more reluctant to limit discovery in civil cases concerning
constitutional and civil rights matters, so it would be less appropriate to
restrict discovery in criminal cases.340
Judges must also intervene to ensure that serious disparity of resources
does not undermine the fairness of digital discovery. Such intervention is
particularly important in criminal cases in order to safeguard the
defendant’s rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel. These
rights have been interpreted to mean that the defendant must be given a
reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial341 and to compel witnesses on his
behalf.342 In cases with voluminous digital evidence, to provide a
338
For a similar proposal calling for more active judicial management of discovery in
criminal cases generally, see McConkie, supra note 51, at 122–25.
339
See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
340
See, e.g., Simon v. Nw. Univ., 2017 WL 467677, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2017).
341
See, e.g., People v. Maddox, 433 P.2d 163, 166 (Cal. 1967) (“That counsel for a
defendant has a right to reasonable opportunity to prepare for a trial is as fundamental as is
the right to counsel.”).
342
Indeed, the Compulsory Process Clause expressly provides the defendant with the
right to have the state’s assistance in compelling evidence for trial on the defendant’s behalf.
But because courts have interpreted the Clause to provide no more than what the Due
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reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial, judges may need to mediate
discussions between defense, prosecution, and detention facilities to ensure
access to discovery for detained defendants.343 To ensure that the defense is
able to obtain material evidence held by third parties, judges can reduce the
restrictions on defense subpoena powers, as a number of courts have
already done.344 Likewise, in cases where the defense needs the consent of
a third party in order for a service provider to release electronic
communications material to the defense, the court can order the third party
to either produce the communications directly or provide the needed
consent so the service provider can produce them.345 If the social media or
email account owner who could provide the relevant consent is dead or
unreachable, the court could order the prosecution to use its search and
seizure powers to obtain the evidence from the social media provider.346
To ensure the robustness of Brady rights to exculpatory evidence in
the era of digital evidence, courts must also actively manage disputes about
who should bear the costs of reformatting, cataloging, or reviewing of
voluminous digital evidence. Some commentators have suggested that
prosecutors should be required to actively seek out Brady evidence within a
mass of digital files and flag this evidence for the defense.347 Such an
approach would be unworkable in our adversarial system. Prosecutors
would find it cognitively difficult to seek out and recognize all the evidence
that is favorable to the defense and contrary to their theory of the case.348
Process Clause already demands, I focus on the Due Process Clause here. Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987).
343
McEnany & Elm, supra note 145, at 60. For examples of such judicial involvement,
see United States v. Bundy, 2017 WL 81391 (Jan. 9, 2017).
344
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
345
Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (Touchstone), 15 Cal. App. 5th 729, 746 (Ct. App.
2017).
346
See Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443, 445 (Cal. App. 1st Dist.
2015), review granted and opinion superseded sub nom. Facebook, Inc. v. S.C. (Hunter),
362 P.3d 430 (Cal. 2015).
347
See Justin P. Murphy & Matthew A.S. Esworthy, The ESI Tsunami A Comprehensive
Discussion About Electronically Stored Information in Government Investigations and
Criminal Cases, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2012, at 31, 41; see also Oran, supra note 93, at 129–30
(“Under a rebuttable presumption that the defense is not equally or better able to find Brady
material within the file, the prosecution must also conduct its own search and identify any
such evidence it finds.”).
348
Caroline Buisman, The Prosecutor’s Obligation to Investigate Incriminating and
Exonerating Circumstances Equally: Illusion or Reality, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 205, 224
(2014). Even if a prosecutor were inclined to seek out Brady evidence for the defense, he or
she may not have an adequate basis for the inquiry, since she does not question the
defendant and cannot always predict what the defense’s strategy or theory of the case is
likely to be.
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The approach would also “place prosecutors in the untenable position of
having to prepare both sides of the case at once.”349
While courts should not impose such an impracticable burden on the
prosecution, they can intervene in other ways to ensure that prodigious
document productions do not undermine the defendant’s right to
exculpatory evidence. First, courts could consider the capacity of each
party to review the evidence and shift cataloging and reviewing burdens to
the prosecution if necessary to ensure the fairness of the proceeding.
Specifically, if the defendant presents a special need for assistance (for
example, if the defendant is detained and acting pro se or is represented by
an under resourced appointed counsel), while the prosecution has the
requisite staff and resources, the court may require the prosecution to take
certain steps to catalog the evidence so as to help the defense find
potentially exculpatory evidence. Such steps could include providing a
detailed table of contents, indexing the disclosed evidence, and providing a
presumptive identification of Brady documents among those files the
prosecution has already reviewed.350 Failure by the prosecution to identify
Brady material in this situation would not in itself constitute a due process
violation as long as the prosecution has disclosed the Brady material to the
defense. Nonetheless, the court could impose sanctions on the prosecution
if it concludes that the latter has failed to comply with a court order to
identify Brady material in documents reviewed by the prosecution.
In cases where the defense shows substantial need, the court may also
order the prosecutor to share a database or software program that the
prosecutor has used to search through ESI. While such a database or
program may in some cases be protected as work product,351 in civil cases,
the privilege can be overcome on a showing of substantial need.352 In
criminal cases, the work product privilege is stricter and does not contain a
“substantial need” exception, but courts can order disclosure where the
items to be disclosed may contain Brady material.353 Courts may also be
349

United States v. Ohle, 2011 WL 651849, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011).
Cf. Oran, supra note 93, at 129–30 (proposing that courts take into account the
defendant’s resources in apportioning the duty to identify Brady material).
351
It is not entirely clear whether a database prepared by information technology staff or
contractors would be protected by the work product doctrine—the question is whether it
contains the mental impressions of the prosecutor concerning the litigation. See, e.g., Gov’t
of Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2005).
352
Under the federal rules, the party must show “substantial need” for the materials and
that it “cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(a)(ii).
353
See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 475 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“Because Brady is based on the Constitution, it overrides court-made rules of
350
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able to order discovery of work product under their inherent authority to
manage the pretrial and trial proceedings, even where the evidence is not
necessarily exculpatory, if it is material to the defense and the interests of
justice require such discovery.354 Current law on this point is uncertain,
however, so an express rule could help judges manage digital discovery
more effectively.
Finally, to ensure fairness in digital discovery, court decisions and
rules should regulate discovery waivers that arise from lopsided bargains in
criminal cases. Such waivers are likely to be increasingly attractive to
prosecutors as the prosecution’s discovery burdens increase in ESI-heavy
cases. But by limiting the information that the defendant receives
(including potentially exculpatory evidence), discovery waivers can
undermine the fairness, accuracy, and transparency of a criminal judgment.
As a recent D.C. Circuit decision highlighted, negotiated discovery waivers
are often problematic because they arise from a plea bargaining dynamic
where the prosecution holds most of the bargaining chips, and defense
attorneys are not always faithful agents of their clients.355 A rule or judicial
order could therefore require attorneys to justify any “substantial discovery
waivers” before such waivers are accepted as part of a plea agreement.356

procedure.”); United States v. Heine, 2016 WL 5934421, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2016); Ex
Parte Miles, 359 S.W.3d 647, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
354
State v. Laux, 117 A.3d 725 (N.H. 2015) (holding that court has inherent authority to
order discovery of certain work product information in the interests of justice); Miles, 359
S.W.3d at 670 (noting that trial court must permit discovery if “the evidence sought is
material to the [d]efense of the accused”).
355
Price v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. Att’y Office, 865 F.3d 676, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The
court explained that the uneven bargaining power leads to waivers that are inconsistent with
public policy interests:
[T]his uneven power dynamic lurks in the background in cases like these and calls for
a careful consideration of Price’s claim. Here Price has shown, through real-world
examples, that enforcing a FOIA waiver would make it harder for litigants in his
position to discover potentially exculpatory information or material supporting an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. This is especially true given that, “with rare
exceptions, only the waivor” in such cases “has the requisite knowledge and interest
to lodge a FOIA request in the first place.” Amicus Br. 27. On the other side of the
scale, the government has offered us nothing more than the unsupported blanket
assertion that FOIA waivers assist in effective and efficient prosecution, without any
support or explanation how. Under these particular circumstances, and based on the
briefing in this case, we have little trouble in concluding that the public interest in
enforcing Price’s waiver is outweighed by the harm to public policy that enforcement
would cause.
356
Brown, supra note 53, at 167. At the insistence of prosecutors, waivers of discovery
and many other rights have become increasingly common in federal prosecutions. See
generally Klein et al., supra note 191. On the other hand, some federal judges have used
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Some courts may even choose to entirely ban certain discovery waivers—
such as waivers of future DNA testing or of future Brady disclosures.357
In short, an active court can help the parties streamline digital
discovery and ensure that the process proceeds fairly. To encourage courts
to take up this role, state and federal rules of criminal procedure should
expressly provide for judicial management of digital discovery. While
judges can arguably already manage the process actively under their
inherent authority, many remain passive in the absence of an express
rule.358 Particularly when dockets are overcrowded, judges might be hard
pressed to provide active management.359 For all those reasons, an express
rule requiring judicial involvement is important.
3. Employing Judicial Adjuncts
Regardless of how active judicial management of discovery is
introduced, it is likely to place significant burdens on judges. For that
reason, the rules should also authorize “judicial adjuncts”—neutral third
parties, such as magistrates, special masters, or coordinating discovery
attorneys (CDAs)— to help the parties manage digital discovery in criminal
cases. This approach is already being used in most civil cases with large
amounts of ESI, and it appears to work well.360
In criminal cases, a number of courts have appointed defense attorneys
to serve as CDAs in select multi-defendant cases with gargantuan ESI,
their authority to issue standing orders or enact local court rules to require broader or earlier
disclosure. See McConkie, supra note 51, at 63.
357
Price, 865 F.3d at 679 (invalidating a negotiated waiver of right to request public
records under FOIA because waiver failed to serve a legitimate criminal justice interest).
358
CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 232 (noting that there are judges “who believe it
is inappropriate to become involved in document and ESI discovery”); Draft Minutes,
Criminal Rules Meeting, Sept. 19, 2016, at 7, in Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules,
Meeting, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2017, at 25 (noting that problems with managing
massive e-discovery are “not going to arise in the courtroom of an experienced judge, highly
engaged, who will craft case management orders to accommodate these situations. The
concern is that if the judge is inexperienced or not as engaged as he should be, Rule 16
procedures become the default and as a result counsel will have great difficulty preparing for
trial.”).
359
See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Defense Counsel, Trial Judges, and Evidence Production
Protocols, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 144–45 (2012) (noting the pressure on judges to move
cases along). But cf. Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea
Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L.
REV. 325, 327 (2016) (finding that judges may become more managerial both to expedite
cases and to advance other goals, such as ensuring a just disposition); Jenia I. Turner,
Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199,
253–54 (2006) (same).
360
Grimm, supra note 249, at 154–56.
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where coordination among several defendants in reviewing discovery is
needed. The CDA is an attorney who has special expertise in handling
electronic discovery and who does not represent a particular defendant, but
instead coordinates discovery for all defendants.361 The CDA helps the
parties find the relevant tools to store, organize, and review the evidence
received and resolve disputes about the mechanics of digital discovery.362
Appointing one defense attorney to manage discovery for multiple
defendants may raise ethical questions in some cases, as “it is unclear
whether the CDA is ever expected to act as an attorney—and, if so, on
whose behalf.”363 If the CDA “represent[s] the defendants’ legal interests
in any manner, then he or she will have responsibilities to all defendants at
the same time,” yet the different defendants’ interests may come into
conflict.364 CDAs’ functions therefore have to be defined narrowly and
carefully in multi-defendant cases. Courts must also conduct a special
hearing to advise defendants of their right to separate and conflict-free
representation and ask defendants whether they agree to joint representation
by the CDA.365
In addition to the potential ethical questions surrounding CDA
appointment in multi-defendant cases, CDAs may be expensive.
The
federal Defender Services Office has argued, however, that if a
knowledgeable CDA is appointed, “the overall case processing times and

361
The federal Defender Services Office (DSO) has contracted with five national CDAs,
who are experts on e-discovery. When federal defense attorneys or judges reach out to the
DSO, the Office can help assess the need for a CDA and coordinate the appointment of a
CDA as necessary. Defender Services Office, Coordinating Discovery Attorneys, at
https://fd.org/litigation-support/coordinating-discovery-attorneys [https://perma.cc/RK3WTAVX].
362
See, e.g., United States v. Vujanic, 2014 WL 3868448 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2014);
United States v. Flores, 2014 WL 1308608, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014) (CDA appointed
for RICO gang case involving hundreds of thousands of documents, 15,800 audio
recordings, and 100 videos, many of which were heavily redacted to protect the safety of
witnesses); United States v. Shafer, 2011 WL 977891, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2011). The
functions and duties of a CDA remain somewhat ill-defined. As one court observed:

A CDA is an attorney, yet it is unclear whether the CDA is ever expected to act as an
attorney—and, if so, on whose behalf. A CDA is not intended . . . to participate in
strategic coordination among counsel for co-defendants. Rather, he or she would be
performing tasks that each individual defense counsel would otherwise perform, but
would be doing so on behalf of all defendants.
United States v. Hernandez, 2014 WL 4510266, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014).
363
Hernandez, 2014 WL 4510266, at *4.
364
Id.
365
Id.
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costs are likely to be reduced.”366 As a result, the popularity of CDAs is
growing, and courts and even some prosecutors in complex federal cases
involving ESI are increasingly requesting or even requiring that defense
attorneys obtain the help of a CDA.367
The court could alternatively appoint a special master to help
coordinate digital discovery and mediate disputes that may arise. Special
masters differ from CDAs in that they work on behalf of the court rather
than the defense and therefore are not likely to raise ethical issues in multidefendant cases. On the other hand, they are also likely to be expensive368
and not as successful in securing the trust of defense attorneys, which
would diminish their effectiveness. Accordingly, special masters are less
likely to be used on a regular basis in criminal matters.
Judges might, however, also be able to rely on federal magistrates to
manage digital discovery disputes in criminal cases, as they already do in
civil cases.369 Although the involvement of magistrate judges is not costfree, it may ultimately be more efficient if it reduces discovery disputes
between prosecutors and defense attorneys and expedites case resolution in
voluminous ESI cases. The value of involving magistrates in criminal case
discovery has already been recognized by local rules that have expanded
magisterial participation in this area.370 And at least at the federal level,
magistrate judges are likely better able to absorb discovery duties than are
district court judges. Over the last three decades, the number of magistrate
judges has increased at a much higher rate than the number of district

366

Defender Services Office, Coordinating Discovery Attorneys, at https://fd.org/
litigation-support/coordinating-discovery-attorneys [https://perma.cc/PEV6-FTYG].
367
CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 233.
368
Thomas E. Willging et al., Special Masters’ Incidence and Activity, Report to the
Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and Its Subcommittee on Special
Masters 7 (FED. JUD. CTR. 2000), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/specmast.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TQA7-A4AG] (finding that the typical rate for special master fees in civil
cases was $200 per hour and that the median total compensation in twelve civil case
appointments studied was about $63,000). But cf. Josh Gerstein, ‘Special Master’ in Cohen
Raid Bills $47K for First Week’s Work, POLITICO (May 29, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/29/michael-cohen-bills-legal-611507
[https://perma.cc/7BUD-3UKE] (reporting on special master in high-profile criminal case
who charged roughly $700/hour for privilege review of voluminous ESI).
369
Grimm, supra note 249, at 154–56 (discussing the use of magistrates in managing
discovery in civil cases); McConkie, supra note 51, at 100–01 (discussing the authority and
expanding use of magistrates in managing pretrial proceedings, including discovery, in
criminal cases); Turner, supra note 359, at 265 (discussing the authority of magistrate judges
to handle pretrial matters, including plea negotiations, in criminal cases).
370
McConkie, supra note 51, at 100–01.
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judges.371 A few courts have already relied on the services of magistrates to
handle voluminous digital discovery in criminal cases, and express
encouragement of this practice can help enhance the fairness and efficiency
of the process.372
4. Drafting Detailed Rules
In addition to managerial judging, more detailed rules are necessary to
address the multiple challenges of e-discovery in criminal cases. Such rules
can provide greater predictability, facilitate negotiations between the
parties, and reduce disputes, leaving less to the discretion and managerial
skills of judges. Draft Rule 16.1 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which mandates consultation between the parties, is a critical first step in
this direction.373 Criminal rules could follow the civil model even further
and require the parties to develop a discovery plan or explain why they
were not able to develop such a plan. The plan would consider digital
discovery issues such as those enumerated in the ESI Protocol and any
other points of contention regarding discovery. It would force the parties to
acknowledge their discovery obligations early in the process and prod them
toward cooperation. It would also provide the court with a better tool to
manage the discovery process should cooperation fail later in the
proceedings.374
Local rules in certain federal districts have already experimented with
such a “discovery checklist” approach to discovery.375 This is an important
source of information for what provisions might be effective. But local
rules cannot provide a long-term, comprehensive solution. Under the Rules
Enabling Act, they cannot substantially exceed existing provisions in the

371

Id. at 101 (citing Douglas A. Lee & Thomas E. Davies, Nothing Less Than
Indispensable: The Expansion of Federal Magistrate Judge Authority and Utilization in the
Past Quarter Century, 16 NEV. L. J. 845, 856–57 (2016)).
372
See, e.g., United States v. Crinel, 2016 WL 5779778 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2016); United
States v. Slade, 2011 WL 5291757 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2011); United States v. Marin, 662 F.
Supp. 2d 155, 160 (D.D.C. 2009).
373
Draft Rule 16.1, supra note 22.
374
See McConkie, supra note 51, at 92–93 (noting that local rule requirements for
pretrial conferences and discovery plans promote cooperation between the parties, but also
“make it easier for the court to impose sanctions for failure to meet any agreed-upon
deadlines”).
375
Id. at 90–92, 95–97 (citing W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(A); D. NEV. LOCAL R.
CRIM. P. R. 16-1; D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.5); see also General Order Regarding Best
Practices for Electronic Discovery of Documentary Materials in Criminal Cases, G.O. 09-05
(W.D. Okla. 2009); Best Practices for Electronic Discovery in Criminal Cases (W.D. Wash.
2013).
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Federal Rules.376 Furthermore, dealing with discovery issues through local
rules or individual judicial discretion raises the problem of disparate
treatment of federal defendants based on the court in which their cases are
brought. For those reasons, uniform state and federal rules on digital
discovery are needed.
Rules of procedure can promote a fairer discovery process by
requiring that the parties produce ESI in a “reasonably usable” form and a
searchable format—a requirement present in the civil rules and imposed by
some courts in criminal cases. In fact, one jurisdiction—New Jersey,
recently adopted criminal rules on e-discovery which require that files must
generally be provided in publicly available formats or with software that
would allow the recipient to review the files.377 Going beyond the New
Jersey model, the rules can specify that if proprietary software is needed to
access the files, and the receiving party does not have the software, the
court may require the producing party to convert the file to a different
format.378 Additionally, the rules may authorize the court to order the party
producing the ESI to provide other technical assistance to enable the
receiving party to view the documents.379 Where the receiving party shows
that metadata are important to the case, the rules could further authorize the
court to order that files be produced in their native format, as well as in a
searchable format.380 In practice, the prosecution is likely to be producing
most of the evidence so it will ordinarily have to bear the costs of
reformatting. But in most cases, it will also have significantly greater
resources than the defense. In those few situations where the asymmetry of
resources is reversed,381 the rules could permit the prosecution to move the
court to shift some of the reformatting costs to the defense.382
The rules could also offer more concrete guidance on the organization
of the ESI produced in discovery. To begin, they could require the
producing party (again, typically the prosecution) to provide an index or
detailed table of contents for disclosed ESI, which could help the receiving
party sift through voluminous data.383 New Jersey, the only state to

376

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a)(1); McConkie, supra note 51, at 115.
See N.J. CT. R. 3:13–3.
378
For civil cases along these lines, see supra note 288 and accompanying text.
379
For civil cases along these lines, see supra note 289 and accompanying text.
380
See N.J. CT. R. 3:13–3; see also note 96 and accompanying text.
381
For a recent example, see Sam Pearson, Deep-Pocketed Arkema Tough Target for
Texas Prosecutors, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 7, 2018.
382
For an example of a rule authorizing the shifting of costs from the prosecution to the
defense under certain circumstances, see N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3.
383
Id.
377
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regulate digital discovery in criminal cases so far, has a similar rule on its
books.384 Prosecutors have also provided indexes or tables of contents on
their own initiative in a number of cases, suggesting that the requirement is
not impractical.385
The rules could also authorize the court to impose further
organizational requirements after evaluating the volume and searchability
of the evidence produced, the resources of the defense, and the ability of the
defendant to assist his or her lawyers with review of the evidence.
Specifically, the court could require the prosecution to identify the most
relevant documents in the production, as well as documents that the
prosecution has not reviewed. It could further require the prosecution to
provide indexes for audio and video files and make them as searchable as
possible. Where the receiving party (typically the defense) shows good
cause, the rules may also permit it to use limited interrogatories regarding
the sources and organization of voluminous ESI produced.386
In summary, more detailed provisions on the form and organization of
digital discovery can help encourage and guide informal discussions
between the parties. Such rules can also help judges manage digital
discovery to achieve fairness and efficiency when discussions between the
parties fail to produce an agreement.
5. Investing in Training and Technology
Beyond implementing the legal reforms discussed in the previous
sections, state and federal authorities and professional associations can
facilitate digital discovery by investing in training and technology for the
lawyers and judges who handle ESI-intensive criminal cases. Such training
has occurred with federal judges and attorneys who handle e-discovery in
civil cases, and it is beginning to happen in criminal cases.387 Professional
384

Id.
See supra Part V.A. As another comparison point, prosecutors in England and Wales
must also provide a “disclosure schedule” that is in many ways akin to an index. The
schedule needs to identify each item containing stored data, provide a “description of what
steps have been taken, by whom, to examine and analyse [sic] the information held on the
storage media, on a chronological basis (e.g., a log detailing times and duration of access,”
and “a listing of the information held on the media, either compiled by the
investigator . . . based on keyword searches or ‘sampling,’ or present on the media itself
(e.g., a directory structure).” IAN WALDEN, COMPUTER CRIMES AND DIGITAL INVESTIGATIONS
ch. 6 (2nd ed. 2016).
386
For civil cases along these lines, see supra note 308 and accompanying text.
387
See, e.g., Broderick et al., supra note 45; CARDONE REPORT, supra note 71, at 232–
34; see also Eric H. Holder, Jr., In the Digital Age, Ensuring That the Department Does
Justice, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii (2012).
385
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responsibility rules in over thirty states recognize the duty of attorneys to
acquire an adequate understanding of technology—and digital discovery in
particular—in order to assist their clients competently.388 State bar
associations and other professional associations serving the criminal justice
community have begun providing continuing legal education to ensure that
attorneys are meeting their duties; attorneys should be encouraged to take
advantage of these learning opportunities.
Technological advances such as predictive coding are also
increasingly used in civil cases to reduce the cost of discovery, and they can
be used successfully in criminal cases as well.389 The main obstacle at this
point is the lack of expertise among defense attorneys with predictive
coding and the lack of funding to hire the relevant experts and invest in the
technology. But jurisdictions may be able to afford purchasing such
technology for use in a centralized fashion, through a statewide or federal
defender service.
To address the massive challenges that the growth of ESI presents for
criminal cases more broadly, legislators ought to invest in a more robust
digital discovery infrastructure for the criminal justice system, similar to the
one already provided for federal prosecutors.390 This infrastructure would
serve not only prosecutors’ offices, but also the courts, public defenders,
court-appointed defense attorneys, and perhaps even retained counsel (the
latter at a cost). It would allow the parties to store and manage ESI and to
resolve digital discovery disputes more efficiently and effectively. It would
also permit more active judicial management of digital discovery.
In brief, better training, technology, and infrastructure would help the
parties understand and solve more easily the challenges of digital discovery.
Investment in this area would produce measurable returns in terms of
quicker resolution of discovery disputes and quicker disposition of cases. It
would also help ensure that the proliferation of ESI does not undermine the
aims of discovery rules—to promote fairness, accuracy, and transparency in
criminal adjudication.

388
See, e.g., State Bar of California, Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility &
Conduct, Formal Op. 2015-193 (2015); MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.1 cmt. 8. As of
September 24, 2018, thirty-one states had adopted the comment to Rule 1.1 requiring
lawyers to maintain technological competence. Robert Ambrogi, Tech Competence,
LawSites Blog, https://www.lawsitesblog.com/tech-competence/ [https://perma.cc/87CM5AST] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
389
See supra notes 267–272 and accompanying text.
390
See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Thanks to technological advances, the volume of evidence available in
criminal cases is growing. An increasing number of crimes are committed
or facilitated in cyberspace.391 Even for ordinary crimes, the pervasive
nature of digital communication—via smartphones and other digital
devices—makes electronically stored information a standard feature of
criminal cases.392 Law enforcement itself is also relying ever more on
digital surveillance technologies and investigation by software.393 As a
result, the disclosure and review of electronic evidence is no longer the
exclusive concern of lawyers handling complex civil cases and white-collar
crime prosecutions. Instead, judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors
across the criminal justice system face the unique challenges of digital
discovery.
The growing demands of digital discovery are likely to push the
parties to cooperate and negotiate about digital discovery, just as they
already negotiate about other aspects of the case. Greater cooperation could
help reduce the cost and volume of discovery, and in some cases, alleviate
unfairness in the process, and courts have rightly begun to encourage it.
But negotiations in criminal cases are not always fairly balanced, and they
do not always succeed. Accordingly, courts and legislators need to
consider regulation of digital discovery that provides a backstop when
cooperation falters.
The civil procedure model offers some useful insights for such
regulations. These include rules requiring the court to intervene and
manage e-discovery when negotiations fall apart, techniques designed to
reduce the cost of e-discovery, and principles designed to address
asymmetries of resources and information.
The civil litigation model has its limitations, however, and
policymakers must chart new ground to address some of the unique
demands of criminal cases. To redress the vast resource, information, and
bargaining disparities in criminal cases, and to protect defendants’ rights to
due process and effective counsel, courts may need to intervene more
actively in digital discovery in criminal cases. Where the interests of
justice require it, courts could help defendants obtain evidence from third
parties, receive evidence in a format that permits adequate review for
exculpatory material, and access digital discovery in detention. These and

391
392
393

See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
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other measures can help prevent the cost and complexity of digital
discovery from undermining the fairness of the criminal proceedings.
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